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INTRODUCTION 
Intercountry adoption has pressed into the public consciousness 
in two contradictory ways.  On the one hand, intercountry adoption is 
presented as a heart-warming act of good will that benefits both child 
and adoptive family.1  The child is characterized as a bereft orphan 
doomed to a dismal future within a poor country.2  All the child 
needs is a chance and a home.  The adoptive family’s simple act of 
love in bringing the child to the promised land (the United States)3 
brings to the adoptive parents a harvest of love from the child while 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University.  My interest in 
the Indian adoption scandals and adoption reform arose from my personal 
experience as an adoptive father of two children who came through several of the 
implicated orphanages.  The stories that my children and other older adoptees have 
told spurred me to dig deeper into the murky world of Indian adoption.  My greatest 
thanks under these circumstances must be to my family: my wife, Desiree Smolin, 
and our adoptive and birth children, who have all lived in different and profound 
ways some of the personal affects of these scandals.  Desiree has been my partner in 
trying to understand the complex issues raised by these scandals, and insisted that we 
not accept reassuring platitudes as sufficient answers.  Many with personal 
experiences in adoption have shared their experiences and viewpoints; while I often 
could not directly credit or describe those experiences, they clearly inform this work.  
I am also grateful to the participants of the Fall 2003 Intercountry Adoption Law 
Conference at Texas Wesleyan Law School, and those who attended my presentation 
to the Cumberland faculty, for their feedback on my initial attempts to present some 
of this material in oral form.  Finally, I wish to thank two Cumberland students, 
Ashley Mims and Vickie Willard, who have worked extensively with me on 
researching and understanding the Indian adoption scandals, as well as a third 
Cumberland student, John Strohm, who has assisted me through research on legal 
issues relevant to the Hague implementation process. 
1 See Kim Clark & Nancy Shute, The Adoption Maze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 12, 
2001, at 60, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 2 See Kathy Boccella, Family Forged amid Tragedy Gives Girls, Parents Chance to Live, 
Love, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2003, at 11L, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 3 Jeff D. Opdyke, Adoption’s New Geography, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2003, at D1.  
(“The U.S. adopts more foreign children than all other nations combined.”). 
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also enriching the nation with a dynamic diversity.4 
Contrasted with the positive face of adoption are numerous 
scandals and horror stories concerning intercountry adoption.  
Adoption is portrayed as child trafficking or baby selling.5  Shadowy 
figures buy, steal, or kidnap children from poor families in 
developing nations for sale to adoptive families in rich nations.6  
Corrupt agencies within the United States collect fees from 
prospective adoptive families and then fail to produce a child.7  
Pregnant women are shipped into United States territory in order to 
place children for adoption without coming under the jurisdiction of 
the immigration authorities.8  This face of intercountry adoption is 
more akin to organized criminal activity than an act of love. 
This Article uses the recurrent adoption scandals in Andhra 
Pradesh, India, as a case study of these two faces of intercountry 
adoption.  The Andhra Pradesh adoption scandals are significant in 
several ways.  First, their recurrent nature illustrates the difficulty of 
“reforming” intercountry adoption.9  Second, the development within 
Andhra Pradesh of movements seeking to keep particular children 
within India, which have been engaged in legal and political conflict 
with prospective adoptive parents seeking to bring children to the 
United States, demonstrates the political and social hazards implicit 
in intercountry adoption.10  This trajectory from scandal to the 
development of activist movements within sending countries willing 
to publicly question the legitimacy of intercountry adoption bears 
watching. 
 
 4 Karen S. Peterson, Census Counts Adoptees: 1.6M Kids, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 
2003, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 5 Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baby Trade, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 115, 
available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 6 See generally Renuka Rayasam, Special Overseas Delivery: U.S. to Simplify Rules on 
Foreign Adoptions, ATLANTA-J. CONST., Dec. 3, 2003, at 1F, available at LEXIS, News 
Library. 
 7 Clark & Shute, supra note 1, at 60. 
 8 Walter F. Roche, Jr., Playing on Mothers’ Hopes, BALT. SUN, Nov. 2, 2003, at 14A 
(reporting expectant mothers being flown to Hawaii to deliver their babies for 
adoption under the guise of preventing a life of poverty for the child), available at 
LEXIS, News Library. 
 9 Editorial, Children as Chattel, THE HINDU, Apr. 29, 2001 (summarizing the 1999 
Andhra Pradesh adoption scandals), available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Another 
AP Orphanage Raided, 61 Infants Rescued, at http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/apr/ 
26ap1.htm (Apr. 26, 2001) (reporting the 2001 scandal). 
 10 Raymond Bonner, A Challenge in India Snarls Foreign Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, June, 
23, 2003, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
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The questions raised by the two faces of intercountry adoption 
are factual, legal, political, and ideological.  Factually, the Andhra 
Pradesh adoption scandals, like those occurring elsewhere, exemplify 
the grave difficulty of attaining transparency in intercountry 
adoption.11  Years after allegations are made, facts remain elusive.  
Legally, the Andhra Pradesh scandals illustrate the wide gap between 
the laws of intercountry adoption and the actual practices.  Politically, 
the scandals reveal the manner in which different interest groups 
within sending and receiving countries employ their varying 
capacities for political mobilization.12  Ideologically, the scandals 
evidence the complex and deep-felt responses and perspectives that 
surface as a result of the supposedly “simple” act of placing a child 
from one nation within a family in another nation. 
The thesis of this Article is that there are systemic vulnerabilities 
in the current intercountry adoption system that make adoption 
scandals, such as the ones in Andhra Pradesh, India, predictable.  
Further, this Article suggests that currently there are no actors in the 
intercountry adoption system with the requisite information, 
authority, and motivation to prevent abusive or corrupt adoption 
practices.  Under these circumstances, “reform” of the intercountry 
adoption system remains elusive and illusory, leading to cyclic and 
repetitive patterns of scandal. 
Finally, the Article asks about possible sources or paths of reform 
sufficient to prevent recurrent scandals such as those in Andhra 
Pradesh.  The Article suggests that the United States government is 
well positioned to alter the system and bring about significant reform.  
If the political will can be found, the United States government could 
use the implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption to create an accountability structure for intercountry 
adoption.  The key to this structure will be a chain of accountability 
under which United States adoption agencies become responsible for 
the acts of their partner agencies and facilitators in sending 
countries. 
Part I of this Article surveys ideals and laws relevant to 
intercountry adoption.  Part II presents an overview of the complex 
 
 11 See generally Ravi Sharma, Children as Commodities, FRONTLINE (May 12–25, 
2001), at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1810/18100350.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2005). 
 12 See generally Gita Ramaswamy, The Baby Harvest: Scandal over Westerners ‘Shopping’ 
for Children in India, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Aug. 2003, available at http:// 
www.newint.org/issue359/currents.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
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scandals which occurred in Andhra Pradesh, India.  Part III analyzes 
the prospects for reform, and in particular, discusses the unique role 
that the United States government can play in reforming 
intercountry adoption. 
I.  IDEALS AND LAWS 
A. International Ideals 
Intercountry adoption is a subject of international law in several 
senses.  First, because intercountry adoption involves the immigration 
of persons from one nation to another, it raises core national 
sovereignty issues with international law significance.13  Second, 
intercountry adoption as a humanitarian matter implicates human 
rights issues, which have become a significant focus of international 
law. 
An exhaustive scope of international law applicable to 
intercountry adoption is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, 
two treaties will be reviewed: the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (“CRC”)14 and the Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
(“Hague Convention”).15  The CRC is probably the most relevant 
human rights convention applicable to intercountry adoption.  With 
the exception of the United States, nearly every sovereign nation, 
including India, adheres to the CRC.16  The Hague Convention is the 
most directly applicable treaty specific to intercountry adoption.  
India has adhered to the Hague Convention effective October 1, 
 
 13 See generally Joanne Selinske et al., Ensuring the Best Interest of the Child in 
Intercountry Adoption Practice: Case Studies from the United Kingdom and the United States, 
80 CHILD WELFARE 656 (2001). 
 14 Convention on Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 
Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter CRC].  
This Article will not discuss the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (OP-CRC).  
For an extensive discussion of the application of this treaty to intercountry adoption, 
see David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming March 2005). 
 15 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]. 
 16 See Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International 
Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 778 (2001) (noting 
that United States and Somalia are the only nations that have not ratified the CRC). 
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2003,17 and the United States is preparing for implementation, 
possibly to begin in 2006.18 
Much of international law, and especially human rights law, is 
arguably hortatory in nature, with little or no effective enforcement 
mechanism.  The primary effect of broadly adopted human rights 
treaties is often to identify and express international ideals and 
standards, rather than to provide an effective means of enforcement.  
Thus, the CRC and the Hague Convention can be viewed as 
expressions of international ideals and standards.  Given the lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms, the line of applicability between 
ratifying and non-ratifying nations can become blurred, as the broad 
ideals of the Conventions can be used as standards to evaluate the 
conduct of even non-ratifying nations.  In this sense, it is useful to 
discuss the CRC and the Hague Convention in relation to the Andhra 
Pradesh adoption scandals, even though most of the relevant events 
occurred before Indian ratification of the Hague Convention,19 and 
the United States has not yet ratified either the CRC20 or the Hague 
Convention.21  The CRC and the Hague Convention remain the most 
relevant sources of international law pertaining to the Andhra 
Pradesh adoption scandals, even where those Conventions were not, 
in the strict legal sense, applicable. 
1. The CRC and Intercountry Adoption 
The CRC appears to take a very limited view of when 
intercountry adoption is appropriate.  The critical text requires that 
state parties “[r]ecognize that inter-country adoption may be 
considered as an alternative means of child’s care, if the child cannot 
 
 17 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, STATUS TABLE 33: CONVENTION OF 29 
MAY 1993 ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, at 
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (latest update 
Oct. 18, 2004) [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION STATUS TABLE]. 
 18 BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/convention/ 
convention_459.html (Feb. 5, 2005). 
 19 The Hague Convention was effective in India as of October 1, 2003.  HAGUE 
CONVENTION STATUS TABLE, supra note 17.  India has designated the Central 
Adoption Resource Agency, New Delhi, as Central Authority.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON 
PRIVATE INT’L LAW, AUTHORITIES, at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act= 
authorities.details&aid=186 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 20 See Vyver, supra note 16, at 778. 
 21 The United States signed the Hague Convention on March 31, 1994, but has 
not yet ratified.  See HAGUE CONVENTION STATUS TABLE, supra note 17. 
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be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable 
manner be cared for in the child’s country of origin.”22  The CRC’s 
preference for in-country over intercountry adoption is compatible 
with the Hague Convention.  However, the CRC also specifically 
prefers in-country foster care over intercountry adoption, and initially 
appears to favor in-country institutional care over intercountry 
adoption.  These latter positions are more controversial, and appear 
to conflict with the Hague Convention.23 
It is notable, in this regard, that the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (“UNICEF”) recently issued a public position on intercountry 
adoption which appears to favor intercountry adoption over in-
country institutional care.24  The statement cites both the CRC and 
the Hague Convention with approval.  In regard to institutional care, 
however, UNICEF states: 
For children who cannot be raised by their own families, an 
appropriate alternative family environment should be sought in 
preference to institutional care, which should be used only as a 
last resort and as a temporary measure.  Inter-country adoption is 
one of a range of care options which may be open to children, 
and for individual children who cannot be placed in a permanent 
family setting in their countries of origin, it may indeed be the 
best solution.  In each case, the best interests of the individual 
child must be the guiding principle in making a decision 
regarding adoption.25 
One could argue that, under the language of the CRC, institutional 
care is not a “suitable manner” for the permanent care of a child.26  
Therefore, a plausible interpretation of the CRC is that it prefers 
 
 22 CRC, supra note 14, art. 21(b), 28 I.L.M. at 1464. 
 23 See William L. Pierce, Accreditation of Those Who Arrange Adoptions Under the 
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption as a Means of Protecting, Through Private 
International Law, the Rights of Children, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 535, 538–
40 (1996) (discussing conflict between CRC and Hague Convention).  Pierce 
suggests that the CRC and an earlier United Nations Declaration “grew out of a 
knowledge of intercountry adoptions that were characterized by largely unregulated 
adoptions, a significant portion of which involved highly publicized abuses.”  Id. at 
539–40.  Pierce tried to reconcile the apparent conflict between the CRC and Hague 
Convention by suggesting that adoptions that comply with Hague norms and 
procedures would constitute a different kind of adoption than the “internationally 
unregulated adoption” referenced in the CRC.  Id. at 540. 
 24 UNICEF, UNICEF’S POSITION ON INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION, at http:// 
unicef.org/media/media_15011.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter 
UNICEF’S POSITION]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 CRC, supra note 14, art. 21(b), 28 I.L.M. at 1464. 
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intercountry adoption to in-country institutional care.  By such 
interpretations, the international community is apparently working 
toward a harmonization of apparent conflicts between the CRC and 
the Hague Convention.27 
Other provisions of the CRC pertaining to both national and 
intercountry adoption28 provide basic standards, as follows: 
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of 
adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be 
the paramount consideration and they shall: 
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by 
competent authorities who determine, in accordance with 
applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent 
and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view 
of the child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal 
guardians and that, if required, the persons concerned have given 
their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such 
counselling as may be necessary;29 
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in inter-country 
adoption, the placement does not result in improper financial 
gain for those involved in it[.]30 
The CRC thus seeks to ensure: (a) the use of the “best interests 
of the child” standard;31 (b) safeguarding of the process in which 
adults (such as parents) relinquish children for adoption, through a 
requirement of government approval, use of an “informed consent” 
standard for relinquishments, and the provision of counseling “as 
may be necessary”;32 and (c) government safeguards against improper 
financial gain in intercountry adoption.33 
Other provisions of the CRC do not directly address adoption, 
but nonetheless have important implications for a system of 
intercountry adoption.  Article 7 states, “The child shall be registered 
immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, 
the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to 
 
 27 For additional discussion of the conflict between the CRC and the Hague 
Convention, see infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 28 CRC, supra note 14, art. 21(c), 28 I.L.M. at 1464 (requiring safeguards for 
intercountry adoption equivalent to those existing in the state of national origin). 
 29 Id. art. 21(a). 
 30 Id. art. 21(d). 
 31 Id. art. 3, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1459. 
 32 Id. art. 21(a), 28 I.L.M. at 1464. 
 33 Id. art. 21(d). 
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know and be cared for by his or her parents.”34  This provision is 
significant to intercountry adoption in several ways.  First, like many 
human rights norms, the requirement of immediate birth registration 
is consistently violated, as over 30% of births worldwide are not 
registered, including nearly two-thirds of the births in South Asia.35  
The failure to register births in sending countries makes it more 
difficult to document the age and family of origin of children, which 
unfortunately facilitates abusive adoption practices. 
Second, the child’s “right to know and be cared for by his or her 
parents” implicates adoption in several ways.  Most directly, adopted 
children generally are not cared for by their parents, in apparent 
violation of the CRC.  UNICEF plausibly explains this conflict by 
noting that children should be cared for by their parents “whenever 
possible.”36  UNICEF thus implies that removal of a child from the 
birth family to an adoptive family would violate the child’s rights 
unless, after the offer or provision of relevant assistance, “a child’s 
family is unavailable, unable or unwilling to care for him or her.”37 
In addition, adoption—or at least closed adoption—has typically 
involved the destruction of any legal relationship or contact between 
the child and his or her biological parents.  The secrecy associated 
with closed adoption has made it difficult or impossible for a child to 
“know” her biological parents even if she, as an adult adoptee, wishes 
to conduct a search.  The CRC thus implicitly raises a question of 
whether systems of adoption that deny children information about 
their biological parents, particularly when a child seeks such 
information, violate the CRC.38  Presumably, defenders of closed 
adoption would argue that the best interests of children justify 
secrecy in adoption, while opponents would claim that openness is in 
a child’s best interests.  Although issues regarding the best interests of 
children are difficult to resolve, it appears that the CRC was not 
 
 34 CRC, supra note 14, art. 7, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1460. 
 35 UNICEF reported that in 2000, 70% of births in sub-Saharan Africa, 63% in 
South Asia, 22% in East Asia and the Pacific, and nearly one-third in the Middle East 
and North Africa went unregistered.  UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, at http:// 
www.unicef.org /protection/index_birthregistration.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 36 UNICEF’S POSITION, supra note 24. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See CRC, supra note 14, art. 8, 28 I.L.M. at 1460.  See generally D. Marianne 
Brower Blair, The Impact of Family Paradigms, Domestic Constitutions, and International 
Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person’s Identities and Heritage: A Comparative 
Examination, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 587 (2001) (analyzing adoption information issues 
from both comparative law and international sources, including CRC). 
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intended to prohibit closed-record domestic adoption systems.39 
Third, the right of a child to a “name” is a poignant reminder 
that adoption can involve the loss of the original name given to the 
child by the birth parents.40  According to the CRC, the vulnerability 
of children to having their names changed, concealed, or lost, 
legitimately or illegitimately, in the adoption process, implicates the 
rights of children. 
The CRC further states, “State Parties undertake to respect the 
right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, 
name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference.”41 
This section also has a paradoxical relationship to intercountry 
adoption.  Intercountry adoption involves the loss of a child’s original 
identity, nationality, name, and family relationships.42  Thus, this 
provision once again underscores that intercountry adoption is, in 
certain respects, inherently destructive of the rights of the child.  Of 
course, the phrase “family relations as recognized by law” reminds us 
that, in order to make a child eligible for adoption, the child’s 
biological family relationships are generally stripped of legal 
recognition.  Adoption requires that a child be made, in some legal 
sense, an orphan—a child without legally recognized, living parents.  
The phrasing of the CRC makes it difficult to tell if the governmental 
act of legally dissolving the parent–child relationship violates the 
child’s rights, or instead falls into a loophole under the “as 
recognized by law” language of Article 8.  Of course, an adoption that 
involves the unfortunate loss of some aspect of the child’s rights 
would still presumably be legal within the framework of the CRC, if 
overall the adoption was in the best interests of the child. 
The CRC further states, “Where a child is illegally deprived of 
some or all of the elements of his or her identity, State Parties shall 
provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-
establishing speedily his or her identity.”43  The question of 
reestablishing the identity of a child would specifically apply to 
 
 39 See Blair, supra note 38, at 642–56.  It should be noted that the dispute over 
closed adoption systems concerns not only the best interests of the adoptee, but also 
issues related to the interests and wishes of birth parents. 
 40 CRC, supra note 14, art. 7, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1460. 
 41 Id. art. 8, para. 1. 
 42 See generally Stacie I. Strong, Children’s Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a 
New Goal, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163 (1995). 
 43 CRC, supra note 14, art. 8, para. 2, 28 I.L.M. at 1460. 
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illegality in adoption.  Intercountry adoption has been plagued by 
claims of illegality, including stealing or buying children from birth 
parents, and the forging of various documents related to the 
relinquishment, abandonment, or original identity of the child.44  
While this Article focuses on scandals that have occurred in Andhra 
Pradesh, India, over 40% of the forty most significant sending nations 
over the last fifteen years are effectively closed to intercountry 
adoption, generally due to “concerns about corruption, child 
trafficking or abduction.”45  The question of what should be done 
with children caught up in such illegalities has thus become a 
concrete problem, plaguing governments, adoption agencies, and 
adoptive parents.  Although the CRC seems to take a clear stand in 
favor of reestablishing the child’s original identity,46 many find the 
issue much cloudier in the context of adoption.  This provision of the 
CRC, of course, has wider application than adoption.  Moreover, 
Article 3 of the CRC creates an overarching principle that, “[i]n all 
actions concerning children . . . the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration.”47  Thus, the CRC is subject to the 
interpretation that, for example, a “stolen child” should not be 
returned to his or her original family if doing so is contrary to the 
child’s best interests.  The subjective nature of the “best interests of 
the child” standard renders disputable the proper outcome in 
virtually any difficult case, including instances of children illegally 
adopted. 
Article 11 of the CRC, however, specifically states that “State 
Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-
 
 44 See, e.g., Kapstein, supra note 5, at 115; Thomas Fields-Meyer et. al., Whose Kids 
are They?, PEOPLE, Jan. 19, 2004, at 74, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 45 ETHICA, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED ICARE LEGISLATION (S 1934) 2, at 
http://www.ethicanet.org/ICAREintro.pdf (July 13, 2004).  The report notes that 
there have been forty different countries of origin in the top twenty countries 
sending children to the United States over the past fifteen years.  Of these, thirteen 
are “currently closed or effectively closed” (sending less than twenty-six children 
annually), while four are reportedly closed “temporarily” to “investigate concerns or 
establish new procedures.”  Id. at 5.  The report further notes that, “[v]irtually all of 
these countries closed due to concerns about corruption, child trafficking or 
abduction.”  Id. at 2.  India presumably would not be among the countries this report 
counts as closed, since only one state, and not the whole country was closed by the 
scandals described in this Article.  As a matter of full disclosure, this author has 
served or currently serves on advisory boards for Ethica, which is an organization 
devoted to ethics in adoption.  However, I had no part in the writing of the report in 
question. 
 46 CRC, supra note 14, art. 8, para. 2, 28 I.L.M. at 1460. 
 47 Id. art. 3, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1459. 
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return of children abroad.”48  This provision could be directly 
applicable to situations in which children are illegally placed abroad 
for adoption.  Once again, however, this provision could presumably 
be limited by the treaty’s command that “the best interests of the 
child” be “a primary consideration” in “all actions concerning 
children.”49 
In several provisions, the CRC addresses the situation of a child 
separated from his or her parents.50  These provisions do not directly 
address adoption, and their general principles favoring the 
reunification or maintenance of family relationships are once again 
subject to the best interests of the child standard.  In relation to 
adoption, these provisions are another reminder of the unusual 
nature of adoption in the context of child welfare, due to the 
severance of biological family relationships.  Although the overall 
scheme of children’s rights strives to protect, maintain, and, where 
broken, reestablish relationships within the biological family, 
adoption seeks to legally sever those relationships, and replace them 
with a new set of family relationships. 
The CRC is notable for its definition of participation rights.  The 
treaty goes beyond traditional definitions of rights that would protect 
or provide for the child, to establish the rights of children to 
participate in decisions affecting them.51  Thus, Article 12 of the CRC 
states: 
1. State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.52 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law.53 
The obvious application of this section to adoption would 
 
 48 Id. art. 11, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1461. 
 49 Id. art. 3, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1459. 
 50 Id. arts. 9 & 10, 28 I.L.M. at 1460–61. 
 51 See generally David M. Smolin, A Tale of Two Treaties: Furthering Social Justice 
Through the Redemptive Myths of Childhood, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 973 n.13 (2003) 
(explaining division of CRC into protection, provision, and participation rights). 
 52 CRC, supra note 14, art. 12, para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at1461. 
 53 Id. art. 12, para. 2. 
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suggest that older-child adoption would sometimes require 
consideration of the views of the child.  The conceptual structure of 
the CRC suggests that as the child’s capacities develop, he or she 
would be given a greater degree of participation and even 
autonomy.54  Although the CRC does not require the consent of the 
child for all older-child adoptions, it is a fair reading of the CRC to 
require the child’s consent at some level of age or maturity.  Thus, 
the CRC indicates that all children capable of being consulted should 
participate by having their views considered, while some, older or 
more mature children, should participate through a requirement 
that the child must consent to any adoption. 
Participation rights could be applied to other adoption issues as 
well.  First, there is the question of which remedy to apply when a 
child has been illegally adopted.  Second, there is the question of 
whether children should have access to information about their birth 
families, or even personal access to them.  The CRC implicitly raises 
the question of whether, and to what degree, the child’s views should 
be heard, or even be dispositive of these issues. 
2. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
As a treaty, the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption is 
only binding on the nations that ratify it.  India recently ratified the 
Hague Convention, effective October 1, 2003.55  The United States is 
working toward ratification, with draft implementing regulations 
released for comment on September 15, 2003.56  Therefore, the 
Hague Convention did not directly apply to the periodic Andhra 
Pradesh adoption scandals.  The Convention will become fully 
applicable to intercountry adoption between India and the United 
States only after both nations have ratified, and begun 
implementation of, the Convention, which apparently will not occur 
before 2006 at the earliest.57 
The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption has two major 
features.  On the one hand, the treaty establishes broad standards 
 
 54 See id. art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 1459–60. 
 55 HAGUE CONVENTION STATUS TABLE, supra note 17. 
 56 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercountry Adoption Act of 
2000; Accreditation of Agencies; Approval of Persons; Preservation of Convention 
Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,064 (proposed Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. 
pt. 96). 
 57 See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 18. 
 2005 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 415 
 
 
and ideals for intercountry adoption in a manner analogous to other 
specialized human rights treaties.  This aspect of the Hague 
Convention is most applicable to all nations, regardless of ratification, 
and will be explored in this part of the Article.  The Hague 
Convention, however, also requires adhering nations to adopt 
specific procedural mechanisms and institutions designed to provide 
a specific means for achieving a system of adoption in accordance 
with the Convention’s broader ideals.  These procedural aspects of 
the Convention are beyond the scope of this Article. 
a. Intercountry Adoption Versus In-Country Institutional 
and Foster Care: Harmonizing the Hague Convention 
with the CRC 
The Hague Convention appears to implement a view that 
intercountry adoption can be superior to in-country institutional 
care.58  The preamble states that the child “should grow up in a family 
environment,” that nations should take, “as a matter of priority, 
appropriate measures to enable the child to remain in the care of his 
or her family of origin,” and that “intercountry adoption may offer 
the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable 
family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.”59 
Professor Sara Dillon has complained that the Hague 
Convention’s preference for intercountry adoption over in-country 
institutional care is not mandatory because nothing in the treaty 
requires sending nations to follow this preference.  Professor Dillon is 
concerned that neither the CRC nor the Hague Convention clearly 
establishes a child’s right not to be subject to the severe harms of 
long-term institutionalization.  She therefore asks whether children 
have a right to a family, and have a right to intercountry adoption in 
preference to institutionalization.60  The recent UNICEF statement 
that “institutional care . . . should be used only as a last resort and as a 
temporary measure”61 is an encouraging sign that the international 
community is recognizing that institutionalization can cause harms 
that violate the rights of the child.  Given the comprehensive nature 
of the CRC, it would not take much creativity to find violations of the 
 
 58 See Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human 
Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with 
the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 179, 209–10 (2003). 
 59 Hague Convention, supra note 15, pmbl, 32 I.L.M. at 1139. 
 60 See Dillon, supra note 58, at 199–215. 
 61 UNICEF’S POSITION, supra note 24. 
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CRC in the long-term institutionalization of children in substandard 
conditions.62  It seems unlikely, however, that any international 
agreement would ever require nations to place children 
internationally.  Whatever difficulties and rights violations children 
may experience in their countries of origin, it is doubtful that nation-
states can be expected to bind themselves to solve those problems by 
sending their children away.  Thus, it is unlikely that international law 
would recognize a right of a child to be adopted internationally, even 
if the law recognized that some children face severe deprivations of 
rights within their home countries. 
Beyond the emerging international consensus condemning 
long-term institutionalization of children, and the preference for 
“family” care, are a range of difficult ambiguities.  Initially, this issue 
may be analyzed in terms of a possible conflict between the CRC, 
which specifically prefers in-country foster care to intercountry 
adoption, and the Hague Convention, which can be read to prefer 
intercountry adoption over in-country foster care.63  The recent 
UNICEF statement preferring intercountry adoption over 
institutionalization is ambiguous on this question of foster care.  The 
UNICEF statement does not mention foster care specifically, but 
seeks placement of children in a “family environment” and a 
“permanent family setting.”  The UNICEF statement contains 
language that is very similar to that of the Hague Convention, which 
also speaks generally of a “suitable family” and “permanent family,” 
without specifically referring to foster care.64  Thus, upon closer 
analysis, the Hague Convention position on intercountry adoption 
versus foster care is also ambiguous, depending on whether a foster 
care arrangement can be considered a permanent family.  Moreover, 
as previously stated, even if the Hague Convention prefers 
intercountry adoption over foster care, it does not impose that 
preference on sending nations.65 
A preference for permanent family care over institutionalization 
therefore does not settle the issue concerning “foster care,” due to 
 
 62 Substandard institutionalization of the child would likely violate the child’s 
rights under various provisions of the CRC.  See CRC, supra note 14, arts. 6, 20, 23, 24, 
25, 27, & 28, 28 I.L.M. at 1460, 1464, 1465–67. 
 63 Compare CRC, supra note 14, art. 21(b), 28 I.L.M. at 1464, with Hague 
Convention, supra note 15, pmbl, 32 I.L.M. at 1139. 
 64 Compare UNICEF’S POSITION, supra note 24, with Hague Convention, supra note 
15, pmbl, 32 I.L.M. at 1139. 
 65 See supra text accompanying note 60. 
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the variety of caretaking alternatives available to children.  The issue 
then becomes, which forms of child care, short of adoption or birth 
families, should be considered “permanent family” care?  Within the 
United States foster care has often been associated with the negative 
features of the foster care system, including multiple moves from one 
foster family to another.  Such weaknesses in the United States foster 
care system are not necessarily universal.  To make matters even more 
confusing, there are some forms of apparently “institutional care,” 
such as SOS Children’s Villages, which seek to offer children a 
permanent “family” with a “mother” and “siblings.”66  Does such care, 
if of sufficiently high quality, come within international 
condemnations of permanent institutional care for children, or is it 
considered a “permanent family?” 
Questions concerning the status of child care arrangements 
short of full adoption are likely unanswerable, due to the underlying 
debate over whether the loss of identity involved in traditional closed 
adoption is truly superior to some kind of open adoption, permanent 
guardianship, long-term foster care, kinship foster care, or other 
arrangement whereby children preserve their original identity and 
relationship to their families of origin while still being raised 
primarily by another “family.”  Thus, the consensus that children 
need a family environment, and the condemnation of starkly 
institutional forms of permanent care, cannot settle the status of 
various traditional and innovative forms of alternative child care for 
children who cannot be raised within their birth families. 
b. Setting Standards for Intercountry Adoption: 
Trafficking, Money, Consent, and Open Adoption 
The Hague Convention shares with the CRC a concern for child 
trafficking and attempts to specifically ensure that adoption is not 
used as a means of child trafficking.  Thus, one of the specific objects 
of the treaty is to “prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in 
children.”67  Toward that end, the Hague Convention requires that 
the “Central Authorities” who act on behalf of contracting states 
 
 66 See generally SOS KINDERDORF INT’L, THE CONCEPT, at http://www.sos-
childrensvillages.org/cgi-bin/sos/jsp/retrieve.do?lang=en&site=ZZ&nav=2.1&BV_ 
SessionID=@@@@0706947969.1105047125@@@@&BV_EngineID=cccdadddhmhkifj
cfngcfkmdfkfdfnj.0 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (describing the SOS Village 
Organization); Prince Frederick, Children Orphaned by AIDS, a New Challenge, THE 
HINDU, Jan. 7, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 67 Hague Convention, supra note 15, pmbl, 32 I.L.M. at 1139. 
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“take . . . all appropriate measures to prevent improper financial or 
other gain in connection with an adoption and to deter all practices 
contrary to the objects of the Convention.”68  Similarly, the Hague 
Convention forbids anyone from deriving “improper financial gain or 
other gain” from intercountry adoption,69 limits payments to costs, 
expenses, and “reasonable professional fees,”70 while forbidding 
“directors, administrators and employees of bodies involved in 
adoption” from receiving “remuneration which is unreasonably high 
in relation to services rendered.”71 
The Hague Convention further mandates that required consents 
to adoption “have not been induced by payment or compensation of 
any kind and have not been withdrawn,”72 and that the “consent of 
the mother, where required, has been given only after the birth of 
the child.”73  Thus, the Convention specifically seeks to ensure that 
children are not bought, and that pregnant women are permitted to 
change their minds about adoption after childbirth.  The Convention 
further requires that those who consent to adoption (such as birth 
parents) be “duly informed”74 as to whether the adoption would 
“result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child 
and his or her family of origin.”75  Thus, the Convention seeks to 
ensure that birth parents are not tricked into signing papers they do 
not understand. 
The Convention does not take a position on closed versus open 
adoption, or the impact of adoption on the legal relationships 
between the child and his or her family of origin.  Adoption within 
the United States has typically involved the destruction of any legal 
relationship between the family of origin and the child,76 with the 
exception of stepparent adoption.  The Convention appears open to 
the possibility of an adoption that does not destroy the child’s legal 
relationship with his or her family of origin.  This matter seems to be 
 
 68 Id. art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1140. 
 69 Id. art. 32, para. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1143. 
 70 Id. para. 2. 
 71 Id. para. 3. 
 72 Id. art. 4(c)(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1140. 
 73 Id. art. 4(d)(4). 
 74 Id. art. 4(d)(1). 
 75 Id. art. 4(c)(1). 
 76 See generally Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: 
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 998 (1995). 
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left to the domestic laws of each country involved.77  As a practical 
matter, when children are taken out of their nation of origin, their 
opportunities for contact with the birth family can be sharply limited.  
However, in a surprising number of instances, contact is established 
between intercountry adoptees and their birth families.  The 
possibility of continued contact, and of sending aid and assistance 
back to the family of origin, then become practical concerns.  Thus, 
the Hague Convention’s attitude towards open adoption is not as 
irrelevant as may first appear. 
B. United States Immigration Law 
A complete review of United States immigration law as it 
pertains to intercountry adoption is beyond the scope of this Article.  
For present purposes, the federal focus on “orphan” status is most 
relevant.  The federal basis for admitting children into the United 
States for purposes of adoption is their status as a child who is an 
orphan.  This requirement goes to the heart of legal and ethical 
principles related to adoption, for if a child is not an “orphan,” then 
presumably he or she is not in need of a new family. 
It is helpful, before analyzing the complex federal definition of 
“orphan,” to recognize the different situations in which children 
might come to be considered orphans.  The most obvious situation, 
of course, is when both parents are dead.  Even this situation, 
however, is potentially equivocal.  For instance, would it be proper for 
intercountry adoption purposes to consider a child whose parents 
have died to be an orphan, even though the child is being raised by 
relatives, such as grandparents, adult siblings, or aunts and uncles?  
Although such a child might fit a dictionary definition of “orphan,” a 
legal definition designed to measure eligibility for intercountry 
adoption might exclude such a child. 
Second, there is a class of children whose parents cannot be 
located, apparently due to natural disasters or armed conflict.  Even 
though it may not be possible to confirm that the parents are dead in 
such instances, the child may be considered an orphan, since the 
parents are clearly unavailable.  Once again, however, there remains 
an ambiguity as to whether a definition of “orphan” should exclude 
situations where other relatives are able and willing to raise the child. 
Third, in some cases infants and young children are 
 
 77 See Hague Convention, supra note 15, art. 26(c), 32 I.L.M. at 1142; Blair, supra 
note 38, at 657. 
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anonymously abandoned, and it seems impossible to trace or find 
either of the birth parents.  In these instances, a system of 
intercountry adoption might want to label children as orphans, even 
though it is almost certain that the parents are alive.  In this instance, 
there is generally no issue concerning extended family, because the 
child generally lacks any family identity, and hence any identifiable 
set of relatives. 
Fourth, there are instances in which one or two parents make a 
conscious decision to relinquish their child to a public or private 
institution concerned with child welfare.  This situation also brings 
with it certain ambiguities.  Was the act truly voluntary?  Should the 
act of relinquishing a child be considered “voluntary” if based on 
poverty, or is there an obligation to provide sufficient assistance to 
allow the child to remain with his or her family?  Did the parent (or 
parents) intend to fully relinquish all rights with respect to the child, 
or rather intend that an institution provide practical help to the child 
(food, clothing, shelter, education), while the child remained legally 
and psychologically a part of the parent(s)’ family? 
Fifth, there are situations where one or both parents seek to 
place a child with a specific family for purposes of adoption.  This 
could be done either on a direct family-to-family basis, or else 
through a public or private intermediary.  It is a common procedure 
in domestic adoptions that a birth parent choose the adoptive family 
for her child, often from a portfolio of prospective adoptive families 
provided by an attorney or adoption agency.  One advantage of such 
a procedure is that it ensures a direct transfer of the child from one 
family to another, avoiding institutionalization or foster care.  
However, it would seem peculiar to define a child who was 
transferred directly from a birth family to an adoptive family as ever 
having been an orphan.  In addition, in the context of intercountry 
adoption, it could seem inherently exploitative, or an occasion for 
illicit child buying, to allow direct transfers of children from poor 
families in developing countries to comparatively wealthy adoptive 
parents from rich nations. 
These possible circumstances under which a child may be 
classified as an orphan form a helpful context for analyzing the 
federal statute, which states: 
The term “child” means an unmarried person . . . who is—a child, 
under the age of sixteen78 at the time a petition is filed in his 
 
 78 The child can be sixteen or seventeen if he or she is a part of an adoptive 
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behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under 
section 1151(b) of this title, who is an orphan because of the 
death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or 
separation or loss from, both parents, or for whom the sole or 
surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care and has 
in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and 
adoption . . . .79 
The complex terms of this federal definition must be broken 
down into their elements to be understood.  The circumstances 
under which a child is considered an orphan include: (1) the death 
of both parents; (2) the disappearance of both parents; (3) 
abandonment by both parents; (4) desertion by both parents; (5) 
separation from both parents; (6) the loss of both parents; (7) a sole 
or surviving parent incapable of providing support releases child in 
writing for emigration and adoption.  These seven circumstances 
correlate to a large degree with the situations analyzed above, and 
thus it is interesting to see how the federal statute resolves the issues 
incident to each. 
1. Death of Both Parents 
A child is considered an orphan when both parents are dead, 
and orphan status apparently applies even if the child is being raised 
by other relatives, at least so long as such other relatives do not legally 
become the child’s parent(s).  Therefore, where a child has lost both 
parents through death, but obtained a new parent, the child is no 
longer an orphan. 
2. Disappearance of Both Parents 
The federal regulations state that: 
Disappearance of both parents means that both parents have 
unaccountably or inexplicably passed out of the child’s life, their 
whereabouts are unknown, there is no reasonable hope of their 
reappearance, and there has been a reasonable effort to locate 
them as determined by a competent authority in accordance with 
 
sibling group which includes a child under sixteen.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F)(ii) 
(2000). 
 79 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F)(i) (2000).  Alternatively, if the child resides in the 
legal custody of the adoptive parents for two years, the child could qualify for 
admission into the United States without first meeting the highly technical definition 
of orphan.  However, few individuals are in a position to live overseas for two or more 
years in order to bring an adoptive child back to America.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(b)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) (2000). 
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the laws of the foreign-sending country.80 
The federal regulations attempt to guard against fraud under this 
circumstance largely through the requirement of reasonable efforts 
to locate the parent(s) by a competent authority of the foreign-
sending nation. 
3. Abandonment by Both Parents 
The federal regulations specifically require that abandonment 
involve a willful act by both parents to forsake “all parental rights . . . 
without intending to transfer . . . these rights to any specific 
person(s).”81  Accordingly, direct transfers by both birth parents to 
adoptive parents is expressly excluded from this definition.  Indeed, 
the regulations go so far as to state that a relinquishment “for a 
specific adoption does not constitute abandonment.”82 
Relinquishment of a child by both parents to a third party “in 
anticipation of, or preparation for, adoption” is within the definition 
only where such third party “is authorized under the child welfare 
laws of the foreign-sending country to act in such a capacity.”83  The 
regulations also specify that placing a child in an orphanage, without 
more, does not constitute abandonment, so long as the parents 
“exhibit ongoing parental interest in the child.”84 
4. Desertion by Both Parents 
The federal regulations provide that desertion occurs when the 
“parents have willfully forsaken their child and have refused to carry 
out their parental rights and obligations,” resulting in the child 
becoming a “ward of a competent authority in accordance with the 
laws of the foreign-sending country.”85  Apparently, desertion occurs 
when the State intervenes to terminate parental rights due to severe 
parental neglect. 
5. Separation from Both Parents 
The federal regulations define separation from both parents as 
the involuntary severance of the parent–child relationship “by action 
 
 80 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (2004). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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of a competent authority for good cause” shown.86  The regulations 
require this to be a parental termination action that is “permanent 
and unconditional,” and also require that the parents be given notice 
and an opportunity to contest.87  In practice, the term seems quite 
similar to that of “desertion” by both parents.  Perhaps the difference 
is that “separation” involves all forms of abuse or neglect requiring 
government intervention in the form of termination of parental 
rights, while desertion is a specific form of neglect. 
6. Loss of Both Parents 
The regulations define “loss from both parents” to mean the 
“involuntary severance or detachment of the child from the parents 
in a permanent manner such as that caused by a natural disaster, civil 
unrest, or other calamitous event beyond the control of the parents, 
as verified by a competent authority . . . .”88  Thus, this category 
subsumes the situation where both parents are dead, presumed dead, 
or missing due to some major event. 
7. Sole or Surviving Parent Incapable of Providing 
Support Releases Child in Writing for Emigration and 
Adoption 
The purpose of this section is apparently to allow one remaining 
parent, incapable of providing support to a child, to release a child 
for intercountry adoption, while at the same time forbidding this 
form of release in instances where a child has two parents.  This 
distinction requires the regulations to define when a parent is a “sole 
or surviving parent.”  The regulations define a “sole parent” as the 
mother of an illegitimate child, but only under limited circumstances, 
such as where the father has severed parental ties or released the 
child for intercountry adoption.89  The regulations provide, however, 
that the “sole parent” category does not apply in countries that make 
no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children.  A 
“surviving parent” involves instances where one parent has died, and 
the child has not gained a new parent.90  In either instance, the sole 
or surviving parent must be “unable to provide for the child’s basic 
 
 86 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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needs, consistent with the local standards of the foreign sending 
country.”91 
The complex federal definition of a child eligible for 
intercountry adoption therefore permits a single parent to release a 
child specifically for emigration and adoption, including release to a 
particular adoptive parent, while denying that same right to two-
parent families.  In addition, the regulations seek to prevent even a 
single parent from releasing his or her child specifically for an 
intercountry adoption, unless that parent is unable to meet the basic 
needs of the child according to that nation’s standards.  Thus, it 
would theoretically be impermissible for even a single parent to 
release a child for intercountry adoption merely to give that child the 
opportunity to live in the United States. 
The regulations seem concerned with preventing intercountry 
adoption from becoming a means for economic immigration into the 
United States.  The implicit policy is that a child should be an orphan 
within his or her national system, independent of any incentive to 
send the child to the United States.  Presumably, the fear is that some 
parents in developing worlds would be willing to place their children 
for “adoption” merely to give them the opportunity for a better life. 
In an effort to guard against adoption as economic migration, 
the regulations strip foreign birth parents of some of the options 
typically exercised by birth parents in the United States.  Birth 
parents in the United States are generally able to place their children 
with the adoptive families of their choice, acting either 
independently or through various intermediaries, regardless of 
whether there are two parents, and regardless of whether they could 
fulfill the child’s basic needs themselves. 
The current statute and regulations were drafted without regard 
to the impact of the Hague Convention.92  An alternative statute, 
effective upon “entry into force” of the Convention, would provide 
alternative grounds for entry of a child into the United States from 
another Hague Convention nation.93  This statute does not require 
that such a child fall within the existing definition of “orphan.”  
 
 91 Id. 
 92 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(a)(1) (“It should be noted that this section was not drafted in 
connection with possible United States ratification and implementation of the Hague 
Convention . . . .”). 
 93 See Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-279, § 302(a), 114 Stat. 
825, 838–39 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(G) effective upon United States 
entry into force of convention). 
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Instead, federal law would permit a child to come into the United 
States when both parents, or a sole or surviving parent, have “freely 
given their written irrevocable consent to the termination of the legal 
relationship with the child, and to the child’s emigration and 
adoption.”94  In addition, where there are two living natural parents, 
they must be “incapable of providing proper care for the child.”95  
This new standard would substantially weaken the protections against 
adoption as a form of economic immigration.  First, it would now be 
possible for both parents to specifically choose an intercountry 
adoption (either generally or with a specific adoptive family), at least 
so long as they could not provide for the child’s basic needs.  In 
addition, if there was only one living parent, that parent could choose 
intercountry adoption even without a demonstration that the parent 
was unable to provide for the child’s basic needs. 
Interestingly, this new, alternative definition of a child eligible 
for intercountry adoption does not literally require the child to be 
defined as an orphan.  It is possible to read too much into this.  
Presumably, the law would still require that children be in need of a 
family before being eligible for adoption.  It is ironic, however, that 
the United States, upon implementation of the Hague Convention, 
would actually be relaxing its standards for regulating intercountry 
adoption in the critical area of defining which children are eligible 
for adoption. 
The obvious explanation for this weakening of standards is 
reliance on other Hague nations to ensure the propriety of 
relinquishments.  If one assumes that foreign-sending nations that 
adhere to the Hague Convention can be relied upon to ensure 
proper relinquishments, then arguably it makes sense to offer birth 
parents in such nations more control and choice over the adoption 
process.  Since domestic birth parents have the option of choosing 
adoptive families for their children, and may relinquish a child for 
adoption even if they are financially capable of supporting their 
child, there is an argument that foreign birth parents should also 
have such options, even in relation to intercountry adoption. 
Unfortunately, the premise that foreign-sending nations who 
join the Hague Convention will have reliable procedures regarding 
relinquishments seems overly optimistic.  As the following 
examination of the law of India will demonstrate, the existence of 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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high legal ideals and elaborate legal procedures for intercountry 
adoption in foreign-sending nations does not guarantee the 
legitimacy and reliability of those processes. 
C. Intercountry Adoption Under the Law of India 
The laws, ideals, and procedures governing intercountry 
adoption in India, in terms of that nation’s role as a country of origin 
or sending nation, are impressive.96  These laws, principles, and 
procedures are generally consistent with the Hague Convention, even 
though India only recently ratified the Convention, which entered 
into force on October 1, 2003.97  If the practices were consistent with 
these laws and ideals, then recurrent scandals such as have occurred 
in Andhra Pradesh would be impossible. 
1. Role of the Indian Supreme Court 
The key documents summarizing the ideals and laws of India 
regarding intercountry adoption are found in the Supreme Court of 
India’s 1984 Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India98 opinion and 
subsequent Supreme Court opinions elaborating and applying the 
principles of the original Pandey decision.99  The case arose through a 
generalized claim of abusive intercountry adoption practices and was 
treated as public interest litigation.  The Supreme Court of India was 
thus invited, at the outset, to prohibit or sharply restrict intercountry 
adoption.  The statutory position of adoption was rather tenuous at 
that time.  The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 
provided limited authority for Hindu persons to adopt Hindu 
children, but adoption of a child was prohibited if the adoptive 
parent already had a child, birth or adoptive, of the same gender.100  
 
 96 For useful overviews of Indian adoption law, and related issues, see ASHA BAJPAI, 
ADOPTION LAW AND JUSTICE TO THE CHILD (1996) [hereinafter BAJPAI, ADOPTION LAW]; 
ASHA BAJPAI, CHILD RIGHTS IN INDIA: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2003) [hereinafter 
BAJPAI, CHILD RIGHTS]. 
 97 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 98 Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.C. 244 (India). 
 99 There are four pertinent subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of India: 
Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1985) Supp. S.C.C. 701; (1987) 1 S.C.C. 66; 
(1990) 4 S.C.C. 531; Unreported Judgments 1991 549. 
 100 Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, No. 78, §§ 7, 8 & 11 (1956), available 
at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195678 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).  The 
definition of a Hindu under the Act includes not only a person of the Hindu religion 
“in any of its forms or developments,” but also a “Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh by 
religion.”  A person who is a “Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew” is explicitly excluded 
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A proposed uniform law of adoption, applicable to all religious 
communities, had been introduced in 1972, but dropped due to 
opposition from the Muslim communities.101  A similar law exempting 
Muslims from application had been introduced in 1980 but also 
failed to gain enactment.102  Therefore, persons or situations not 
falling within the limited statutory definitions of the Hindu Adoption 
and Maintenance Act, including non-Hindus seeking to adopt within 
India, and most foreigners seeking to adopt, were left to the 
provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890.103  This Act did 
not provide for adoption, but rather for guardianship lasting until 
the age of majority.104 
The Supreme Court of India could have relied on the absence of 
explicit statutory provisions for non-Hindu adoptions as the basis for 
a broad prohibition of most intercountry adoptions.  Instead, the 
Court embraced intercountry adoption in terms quite consistent with 
those later expressed in the Hague Convention.  The Court’s primary 
rationale and focus appeared to be child welfare.  Thus, the Court 
stated that, “[e]very child has a right to love and be loved and to grow 
up in an atmosphere of love and affection and of moral and material 
security and this is possible only if the child is brought up in a 
family.”105 
The Court created a series of preferred outcomes for children, 
roughly as follows:106 
(1) Child with biological family;107 
(2)  Child adopted within India;108 
(3) Child adopted out of country by Indians residing abroad;109 
(4)  Child adopted out of country by “adoptive couples where at 
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least one parent is of Indian origin”;110 and 
(5)  Child adopted out of country by person(s) who are not of 
Indian origin.111 
Although this priority list may appear nationalist in orientation, 
the Court grounded these priorities in concerns with the greater 
difficulties that adoptive children face in assimilating to their 
adoptive families in situations involving “cultural, racial or linguistic 
differences.”112  Interestingly, the CRC, although created some years 
later, specifically states that in adoption, “due regard shall be paid to 
the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s 
ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic background.”113  Therefore, 
the Court’s preference that Indian children be adopted by Indian 
parents, whether residing in India or elsewhere, later found support 
in the world’s most significant treaty on children’s rights.  At the 
same time, the Court was willing to countenance foreign adoption, 
even by non-Indians, in order to save children from certain fates. 
The Court stated that: 
If it is not possible to find suitable adoptive parents for the child 
within the country, it may become necessary to give the child in 
adoption to foreign parents rather than allow the child to grow 
up in an orphanage or an institution where it will have no family 
life and no love and affection of parents and quite often, in the 
socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, it might have 
to lead the life of a destitute, half clad, half-hungry and suffering 
from malnutrition and illness.114 
The Court pointed out that such conditions would “prevent the 
realisation of [a child’s] full human potential making [the child] 
more likely to grow up uneducated, unskilled and unproductive,” 
with a life “blighted by malnutrition, lack of health care and disease 
and illness caused by starvation, impure water and poor sanitation.”115  
The Court stated that allowing foreign adoption was consistent with 
India’s National Policy on Children because it would permit 
otherwise “destitute, neglected or abandoned” children to realize 
their full potential, and to live a “healthy, decent life, without 
privation and suffering arising from poverty, ignorance, malnutrition 
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and lack of sanitation . . . .”116  The Court was unflinching in its 
assessment of the conditions under which many in India lived and 
was willing to countenance the loss of some of India’s children, if 
necessary to save them from such a fate. 
The far-ranging opinion of the Court showed broad familiarity 
with a variety of adoption issues.  For example, regarding older-child 
adoption, the Court noted that it is easier for younger children to 
become “assimilated and integrated” into their new environment and 
that “a problem may also arise whether foreign adoptive parents 
would be able to win the love and affection of” older children.117  
Similarly, the Court’s procedures specifically provided for the event 
of disruption; that is, the failure of an adoption after placement into 
the adoptive family but prior to finalization of the adoption.118 
2. Intercountry Adoption Institutions and Procedures 
Delineated by the Indian Supreme Court 
Much of the Court’s opinion involved the creation or 
recognition of an elaborate set of procedures and institutions for 
intercountry adoption, which the Court constructed despite the lack 
of a statutory framework beyond the Guardians and Wards Act of 
1890.  The Court’s procedures and institutions deliberately built 
upon those which had been implemented in certain local areas 
within India, particularly Bombay, Delhi, and Gujarat.119  The 
procedures and institutions for foreign adoption envisioned by the 
Supreme Court can be summarized as follows: 
a. Relinquishment of the Child by Birth Parents 
Where the birth parents are known, they are to be counseled 
and told that if the child is adopted, they will have no further contact 
with the child.120  There is to be no duress to coerce relinquishment 
of a child, and birth parents are given three months after 
relinquishment to change their minds and reclaim the child.  In 
addition, birth parents are not permitted to make a decision 
regarding adoption “before the birth of the child or within a period 
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of three months from the date of birth.”121  In regard to the 
documentation of relinquishments, the Court stated: 
But in order to eliminate any possibility of mischief and to make 
sure that the child has in fact been surrendered by its biological 
parents, it is necessary that the institution or centre or home for 
child care or social or child welfare agency to which the child is 
surrendered by the biological parents, should take from the 
biological parents a document of surrender duly signed by the 
biological parents and attested by at least two responsible persons 
and such document of surrender should not only contain the 
names of the biological parents and their address but also 
information in regard to the birth of the child and its 
background, health and development.122 
If the birth parents are not known, an effort must be made by 
the institution having care of the child to “try to trace the biological 
parents of the child.”123  If the birth family is not found, then the 
child is regarded as “an orphan, destitute or abandoned child” and 
considered free for adoption without any need for consent by the 
birth parents.124  The Court’s second Laxmi Kant Pandey opinion 
stated, however, that “no children who are found abandoned should 
be deemed to be legally free for adoption until the Juvenile Court or 
the Social Welfare Department declares them as destitutes or 
abandoned.”125 
b. Child Is Offered for Adoption to Prospective Indian 
Adoptive Parents: Proposal for Voluntary Coordinating 
Agencies 
The Indian agency is required to make “every effort . . . to find 
placement for the child by adoption in an Indian family.”126  The 
child cannot be made available for foreign adoption until a two 
month period of making the child available for adoption within India 
has passed, unless the “child is handicapped or is in [a] bad state of 
health needing urgent medical attention, which is not possible for 
the social or child welfare agency looking after the child to 
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provide . . . .”127 
The Supreme Court, in its second Pandey decision, proposed the 
use of a “voluntary Co-ordinating agency” within each state or large 
city to coordinate and facilitate efforts to locate adoptive parents for 
children within India.128  This concept was modeled after an 
experimental program in Bombay.129  Perhaps as an inducement, the 
Court suggested that the period of time for seeking an adoptive 
family within India be reduced to three to four weeks, if such a system 
was functioning.130 
c. The Central Adoption Resource Agency (CARA) 
The Supreme Court proposed the creation of a Central 
Adoption Resource Agency: 
[I]t would be desirable if a Central Adoption Resource Agency is 
set up by the Government of India with regional branches at a few 
centres which are active in inter-country adoptions.  Such Central 
Adoption Resource Agency can act as a clearing house of 
information in regard to children available for inter-country 
adoption and all applications by foreigners for taking Indian 
children in adoption can then be forwarded by the social or child 
welfare agency in the foreign country to such Central Adoption 
Resource Agency and the latter can in its turn forward them to 
one or the other of the recognised social or child welfare agencies 
in the country.  Every social or child welfare agency taking 
children under its care can then be required to send to such 
Central Adoption Resource Agency the names and particulars of 
children under its care who are available for adoption and the 
names and particulars of such children can be entered in a 
register to be maintained by such Central Adoption Resource 
Agency.131 
d. Agencies 
 i.  Indian Agencies 
The Supreme Court was quite clear that: 
[I]t should not be open to any and every agency or individual to 
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process an application from a foreigner for taking a child in 
adoption and such application should be processed only through 
a social or child welfare agency licensed or recognised by the 
Government of India or the Government of the State in which it 
is operating . . . .132 
Indeed, the Court specifically directed that the Government of India 
create a list, within three months, of recognized agencies, beyond the 
two regarded as already recognized (Indian Council of Social Welfare 
and Indian Council for Child Welfare).133  The Court found it 
“desirable” to only recognize agencies “engaged in the work of child 
care and welfare . . . since inter-country adoption must be looked 
upon not as an independent activity by itself, but as part of child 
welfare programme . . . .”134  The Court was concerned that 
recognizing agencies set up only for adoption would “degenerate into 
trading.”135  The Court also suggested that agencies be examined to 
determine if they had “proper staff with professional social work 
experience, because otherwise it may not be possible for the social or 
child welfare agency to carry out satisfactorily the highly responsible 
task of ensuring proper placement of a child with a foreign adoptive 
family.”136  The Indian government was to send the list of recognized 
agencies to foreign governments and state courts.137 
The Court did discuss the issue of networking between 
recognized and unrecognized agencies, as follows: 
Situations may frequently arise where a child may be in the 
care of a child welfare institution or centre or social or child 
welfare agency which has not been recognised by the 
Government.  Since an application for appointment as guardian 
can, according to the principles and norms laid down by us, be 
processed only by a recognised social or child welfare agency and 
none else, any unrecognised institution, centre or agency which 
has a child under its care would have to approach a recognised 
social or child welfare agency if it desires such child to be given in 
inter-country adoption, and in that event it must send without any 
undue delay the name and particulars of such child to the 
recognised social or child welfare agency through which such 
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child is proposed to be given in inter-country adoption.138 
It was later alleged that this networking privilege was abused, as 
“unrecognised agencies are using recognised placement agencies as 
post offices for processing cases in respect of children which are in 
the custody of the unrecognised agencies with which the recognised 
agencies have nothing to do.”139  The Court rejected this practice, 
ruling that recognized agencies could not process a guardianship 
application for a foreigner unless the child had been in their custody 
for at least one month prior to the “making of the application.”140  
The Court emphasized, in this regard, that the recognized agency was 
responsible for preparation of the child study report, including a 
medical report.141  Thus, the Court rejected the use of recognized 
agencies as “a post office or conduit pipe for the benefit of an 
unrecognised agency.”142 
 The Indian agencies were given a variety of critical tasks, 
beyond the care of the children, including: (a) creating a detailed 
child study form, including identifying information, information 
about original parents, a health report prepared by a physician, and 
information as to the physical, intellectual, and emotional 
development of the child;143 (b) determining if the child is legally free 
for adoption, including any necessary investigation—if the parents 
surrender the child, the agency must oversee the taking of valid 
relinquishment documents;144  and (c) prosecuting the guardianship 
petition in the local court.145 
 ii.  Foreign Agencies 
The Supreme Court of India prohibited independent adoptions, 
in which foreigners apply directly to the Indian agency without the 
use of an agency from their home country.  One exception to this 
prohibition concerns direct transfers of children from birth to 
adoptive families, which the Indian Supreme Court, somewhat 
surprisingly, has permitted.146  The Court further required the 
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Government of India to “prepare a list of social or child welfare 
agencies licensed or recognised for inter-country adoption by the 
government of each foreign country where children from India are 
taken in adoption . . . .”147 
The Court gave several important tasks to foreign agencies.  
First, the Court made foreign agencies responsible for the 
preparation of a home study report on the adoptive family.  This 
process ensures that the adoptive parents will be suitable parents for 
the child and will be “able to handle trans-racial, trans-cultural and 
trans-national problems likely to arise from such adoption.”148  
Second, foreign agencies would act as a buffer between the adoptive 
family and Indian agencies and individuals, in order to avoid illicit 
monetary demands.  In this way, the Court hoped to “reduce, if not 
eliminate altogether the possibility of profiteering and trafficking in 
children.”149  Finally, foreign agencies undertook the task of providing 
supervision and security for the child between the time of arrival in 
the foreign country and finalization of the adoption.150 
The Court was quite aware that the absence of a broader Indian 
adoption statute meant that many adoptive parents would only 
receive guardianship within India.  The Court only wanted foreign 
adoption to occur when the child would be fully adopted under the 
laws of the recipient nation, with rights equivalent to those of a 
biological child.151  The foreign agency was to ensure that such an 
adoption was legally possible, and to monitor the well-being of the 
child prior to finalization of the adoption.  The foreign agency was 
responsible for ensuring finalization within two years of arrival, 
sending regular progress reports on the child prior to adoption, and 
sending the adoption order to the Indian agency.152  In the event of 
disruption of the adoption prior to finalization, the foreign agency 
was responsible to “take care of the child and find a suitable 
alternative placement” with the approval of the Indian agency.153 
Thus, the Court did not want to send Indian children overseas, 
under a mere Indian guardianship order, without having a legally 
recognized agency within the receiving country responsible for 
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overseeing the process to its culmination in a successful legal 
adoption. 
e. Scrutiny 
Scrutiny agencies were to assist the local court in evaluating 
whether “it would be in the interest of the child to be given in 
adoption to the foreign parents.”154  A “scrutinizing agency must be 
an expert body having experience in the area of child welfare and it 
should have nothing to do with placement of children in adoption 
for otherwise objective and impartial evaluation may not be 
possible.”155 
f. Local Courts 
Once an adoption had been found acceptable by the Indian 
agency, the Voluntary Coordinating Agency (“VCA”), and CARA, and 
with the advice of the scrutinizing agency, the local court would 
evaluate the guardianship petition under the 1890 Act.  The adoption 
would only go forward if the local court found the foreign adoption 
to be in the interests of the child.156  The court, however, could only 
grant guardianship for the purposes of the child being brought to the 
foreign country, where the foreign guardians were expected to 
complete an adoption under their own law.157 
3. The Indian Supreme Court Addresses Money and 
Corruption 
The Indian Supreme Court repeatedly expressed concerns about 
the possibility that foreign adoption could become a form of 
“profiteering and trafficking in children.”158  The Court constructed a 
number of safeguards against these evils.  First, as noted above, the 
Court forbade independent adoptions as a way of reducing occasions 
where a foreigner, “in his anxiety to secure a child for adoption,” 
could “be induced or persuaded to pay any unconscionable or 
unreasonable amount which might be demanded by the 
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agency . . . .”159  This safeguard relies heavily on the integrity of 
foreign agencies as buffers against corruption.  Second, the Court 
forbade representatives of foreign adoption agencies working in 
India from “scouting for children” or receiving children directly from 
birth parents, “in order to prevent taking of children from needy 
parents by offering them monetary inducement . . . .”160  Third, the 
Court required that recognized Indian agencies “maintain proper 
accounts which shall be audited by a chartered accountant at the end 
of every year.”161 
Fourth, the Court placed limits on the amount of money that 
Indian agencies could recover: 
[T]he social or child welfare agency which is looking after the 
child selected by a prospective adoptive parent, may legitimately 
receive from such prospective adoptive parent maintenance 
expenses at a rate of not exceeding 60 Rs per day [approximately 
$1.25] (this outer limit being subject to revision by the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Government of India from time to time) from the 
date of selection of the child by him until the date the child leaves 
for going to its new home as also medical expenses including 
hospitalisation charges, if any, actually incurred by such social or 
child welfare agency for the child.162 
The Court required such bills to be submitted to and paid by the 
foreign agency, presumably in the hope that such an intermediary 
role would guard against “profiteering.”163 
The Court also permitted the Indian agency to recover a 
maximum of 4000 rupees (approximately $90), to cover “legal 
expenses, administrative expenses, preparation of child study report, 
preparation of medical and I.Q. reports, passport and visa expenses 
and conveyance expenses . . . .”164  The Court’s 1987 supplemental 
judgment raised this limit to 6000 rupees, based largely on increases 
in visa fees by the United States and other countries, and the “high 
fees charged by lawyers.”165  The Court also stated that “surgical or 
medical expenses” are “recoverable . . . against production of bills or 
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vouchers.”166 
The Court regarded the various limits on adoption costs to be 
revisable by the Indian government.167  CARA regulations as of 
October 2003 limit per day maintenance expenses to 100 rupees, 
about $2.25 per day, and the expense limitation is 10,000 rupees, 
about $225.168  The Court emphasized that the court granting the 
guardianship order should review and sanction the amounts to be 
paid to the Indian agency as a “greater safeguard” and because the 
various limits created by the Court were outer limits not automatically 
awarded.169 
Fifth, the Court also discussed the important issue of voluntary 
donations by foreigners to Indian agencies.  The Court permitted 
such voluntary donations, above and beyond the limits set for 
maintenance, medical, and other expenses, but stated that such 
donations shall be received after “the child has reached the country 
of its adoptive parents.”170  This requirement presumably was 
intended to preserve the “voluntary” nature of the “donation.”171 
The Court therefore attempted to balance the need to safeguard 
against profiteering and child trafficking against the need to allow 
agencies providing for children to meet their expenses and accept 
donations. 
4. The Indian Supreme Court on Family-to-Family 
Adoption 
The elaborate institutional apparatus for intercountry adoption 
created by the Supreme Court of India seems largely based on a 
distrust of Indian child welfare agencies.  This is illustrated by the 
Court’s treatment of direct agreements between Indian birth parents 
and foreign adoptive parents.  The Supreme Court stated in the first 
Laxmi Kant Pandey decision: 
We may make it clear at the outset that we are not concerned 
here with cases of adoption of children living with their biological 
parents, for in such class of cases, the biological parents would be 
the best persons to decide whether to give their child in adoption 
to foreign parents.  It is only in those cases where the children 
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sought to be taken in adoption are destitute or abandoned and 
are living in social or child welfare centres that it is necessary to 
consider what normative and procedural safeguards should be 
forged for protecting their interest and promoting their 
welfare.172 
Thus, virtually the entire edifice of procedural safeguards 
erected by the Indian Supreme Court for intercountry adoption is 
apparently inapplicable in instances where an Indian family hands a 
child directly over to a foreign family for purposes of adoption. 
A recent case from the Supreme Court of India, Smt. Anokha v. 
The State of Rajasthan,173 applies these comments from the Pandey 
decision to a specific dispute.  Anokha concerned a family-to-family 
transfer of a child for purposes of adoption.  The couple hoping to 
adopt was from Italy and had been coming to India for twenty years, 
hiring Sumer Singh Yadav as a taxi driver to “tour the country.”174  In 
2000, Sumer Singh Yadav died in an accident after dropping the 
Italian couple off at their destination.  The widow, Anokha, was left 
with their six children, including five daughters.  The Italian couple, 
then childless, offered to adopt one of the girls, named Babu Alka, 
and the mother agreed.  A guardianship petition, relying upon the 
Guardians and Wards Act of 1890, was filed in the local court and 
various relevant documents pertaining to the suitability of the Italian 
couple as adoptive parents were submitted.175  The local court, 
however, rejected the guardianship petition because of the failure to 
adhere to the normal procedures for intercountry adoption, 
including sponsorship by an Italian child welfare agency recognized 
by the Indian government and the issuance of a no objection 
certificate (“NOC”) by the central Indian government.  The State 
High Court agreed with the local court.176  The Supreme Court of 
India, however, citing language from the first Pandey decision and 
other precedents, held that the guardianship petition should be 
granted.177 
The Supreme Court of India noted that the Pandey case had 
been initiated by a letter “complaining of mal-practices indulged in 
 
 172 Id. at 264. 
 173 Smt. Anokha v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 SOL Case No. 809 (India), available at 
http://www.supremecourtonline.com/cases/9192.html (Feb. 5, 2005). 
 174 Id. para. 2. 
 175 Id. paras. 2–3. 
 176 Id. paras. 5–6. 
 177 Id. para. 17. 
 2005 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 439 
 
 
by social organizations and voluntary agencies engaged in the work of 
offering Indian children in adoption to foreign parents.”178  The 
implication was that the Pandey decision was inapplicable where 
Indian agencies were not involved in the transfer of the child from 
birth to adoptive family.  The Court specifically quoted the language 
from Pandey stating that, where children were still living with their 
biological parents, the parents “would be the best persons to decide 
whether to give their children in adoption to foreign parents.”179  The 
Court then explained: “The reason is obvious.  Normally, no parent 
with whom the child is living would agree to give a child in adoption 
unless he or she was satisfied that it would be in the best interest of 
the child.  That is the greatest safeguard.”180 
The Indian Supreme Court did demand a few safeguards for the 
child in the Anokha decision.  In particular, the Supreme Court 
required that the foreign couple (1) file an affidavit with the local 
court undertaking to adopt the child within two years and to produce 
the child, if required, until proof of adoption was filed with the local 
court; (2) deposit with the local court a sum sufficient to pay the 
child’s return airfare to India with the amount to be returned once 
the child was adopted; and (3) submit to the local court annual 
reports, with photographs, concerning the child’s welfare and 
education and inform the local court of any changes of address.181  
These reporting obligations terminated upon finalization of the 
adoption in Italy.182  These requirements adapt to a direct family-to-
family adoption the usual protections applicable to foreign adoptions 
during the period between the granting of a guardianship petition in 
India and the issuance of a full adoption decree in the foreign 
country.  Nonetheless, the pre-guardianship protections provided in 
Pandey, which go to the question of whether the child will be given to 
the foreign family for purposes of adoption, remain inapplicable to 
direct family-to-family adoption agreements. 
It seems odd that the Indian Supreme Court did not focus more 
attention on the obvious possibility of abuse implicit in direct 
transfers of children from Indian birth families to unrelated 
foreigners.  The economic imbalance between the hundreds of 
 
 178 Id. para. 8. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. para. 17. 
 182 Id. 
   
440 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:403 
 
 
millions of poor Indians and well-off citizens of wealthy nations such 
as Italy arguably casts a long shadow of exploitation over any such 
transfers of a child.  The Italian couple in question in the Anokha case 
very likely had an annual income greater than fifty times that of the 
birth family, even before the death of the father; once the father 
died, this gap could have grown to one hundred times.  Along with 
this gap, the struggle to survive of an Indian widow with six children, 
five of whom would require dowries to marry, is obvious.  “Helping” a 
family by taking a child away from her mother is arguably an 
extraordinarily cruel form of assistance.  If the Italian family was 
simply concerned for the well-being of the family of their former taxi 
cab driver, it would have been well within their means to financially 
assist the family without taking their child away from them.  The very cost 
of the plane ticket for the child—an estimated 50,000 rupees 
according to the Court, about $1100—would likely have made a 
significant difference in the life of this family, and certainly would 
have provided for any needs of the child for a number of years, if she 
had remained in India with her family. 
In addition, the risks of child-selling in direct transfers of 
children from poor Indian birth families to comparatively wealthy 
foreigners seem significant.  It would seem very difficult to prevent 
“under the table” direct payments made, in essence, as payment for a 
child.  Intentional child-buying under the guise of adoption therefore 
seems a danger inherent in this form of adoption.  Unintentional 
child buying is another danger, as money “given” to birth families as 
gifts or voluntary donations, which may appear gratuitous and kind to 
foreigners, could be interpreted as inducements to consent to 
adoption.  Once again, the extreme economic imbalance between 
many Indian birth families and wealthy foreign families creates a 
severe danger of exploitation, in this instance in the form of 
intentional or unintentional child buying. 
The apparent answer of the Supreme Court of India to these 
inherent dangers of family-to-family handovers of children for 
intercountry adoption is twofold.  First, the Court refers to the “rights 
and choice of an individual to give his or her child in adoption to 
named persons, who may be of foreign origin.”183  Although the Court 
does not elaborate on this point, the concept of a right to transfer 
parental rights to others is both suggestive and disturbing.  Viewed 
positively, this right of transfer may embody the desire, in a society 
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with often desperate poverty, that birth families be given a full range 
of choices in fulfilling their parental obligations, including that of 
providing for their children through choosing appropriate adoptive 
parents.  Second, the Indian Supreme Court explicitly relies on the 
role of local courts, under the 1890 Guardians and Wards Act, in 
ensuring: (1) the voluntariness of the relinquishment; (2) the lack of 
“any extraneous reasons such as receipt of money” for the 
relinquishment; (3) proper notice to the birth family of the 
significance of such relinquishment; (4) the suitability of the adoptive 
parents; and (5) that “the arrangement would be in the best interests 
of the child.”184  The point of the Court seems to be that, whatever the 
dangers involved in direct transfers of children from Indian families 
to foreign adoptive families, the involvement of the local courts in 
evaluating guardianship petitions remains a sufficient safeguard. 
The ultimate lesson of the Supreme Court’s treatment of direct 
family-to-family transfers is, therefore, that the Court distrusts Indian 
voluntary agencies to such a degree that it perceives even more 
dangers of abuse when they are involved than when they are absent.  
In the Court’s view, the presence of such Indian agencies, acting as 
intermediaries or making decisions on behalf of a child, precipitates 
the necessity of elaborate protective measures beyond the usually 
sufficient procedures of the local court. 
Whatever the Supreme Court of India may have held regarding 
such direct transfers of children for intercountry adoption under 
Indian law, however, is not dispositive of the question under either 
United States law or international law.  For instance, if in the Anokha 
case, the adoptive family had been United States citizens seeking 
entry for the child into the United States, it would have been 
debatable whether the child qualified as an “orphan” under present 
United States immigration law.  If a direct transfer between birth and 
adoptive family had been attempted while the father was alive, clearly 
it would have been impermissible because United States law would 
not consider such a child an orphan for immigration purposes.185 
Nevertheless, United States law does apparently allow a “sole or 
surviving parent . . . incapable of providing the proper care” to “in 
writing irrevocably release[] the child for emigration and 
adoption,”186 even where the child is directly transferred from birth to 
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adoptive family.  The issue in the Anokha case, however, would have 
been whether the mother was “incapable of providing the proper 
care,” meaning “that a sole or surviving parent is unable to provide 
for the child’s basic needs, consistent with the local standards of the 
foreign sending country.”187  This question may have been fairly 
debatable both ways in Anokha.  On the one hand, a poor widow in 
India left with five girls and one boy could appear to be in a very 
precarious position.  On the other hand, the Indian Supreme Court 
opinion does not describe the financial situation of the family in any 
detail.  It is possible that there was some provision for basic needs, or 
that some of the children were old enough to work and contribute to 
the family.  Indeed, if the widow had been completely destitute, 
presumably she would have been forced into abandoning all of her 
children, not merely transferring one out of six to a foreign family. 
As explained above, United States immigration law would grow 
more lenient on precisely this point once the Hague Convention 
entered into force.  Federal law at that point would clearly permit a 
direct transfer from a widow to an adoptive family, as in the Anokha 
case, without proof of an inability to meet the child’s basic needs.188  
Thus, the United States government would entrust to the foreign-
sending government the entire task of prohibiting exploitative 
transfers of children from widows to United States adoptive parents. 
It is unclear, however, whether the Indian government’s 
treatment of the Anokha case was consistent with its obligations under 
the Hague Convention.  The Indian government’s decision to 
virtually eliminate the role of the central government, and especially 
that of CARA, in family-to-family transfers does not seem to fit with 
the Hague Convention, which has no such exception.  Indeed, the 
Hague Convention could be read to forbid, or at least strictly 
regulate, direct family-to-family transfers of children for purposes of 
intercountry adoption.189  Although the Indian government may view 
local courts as a sufficient safeguard for intercountry adoption, in 
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 188 See supra Part I.B. 
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family-to-family direct transfer cases, it seems likely that the Hague 
Convention would require a greater role for the central government. 
5. Institutional Development of the Indian System for 
Foreign Adoption 
The foreign adoption system outlined by the Indian Supreme 
Court had been largely based on those developed locally within 
certain parts of India.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s activism led 
to the development and coordination of a national system for foreign 
adoption.  The Central Adoption Resource Agency (“CARA”), 
proposed by the Court, was created on June 28, 1990, “under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Welfare in pursuance of Cabinet decision 
dated 9-5-1990.”190  CARA was designed to “deal with all matters 
concerning adoption,” as “[i]n the Government of India all matters 
related to adoption shall be dealt within the Ministry of Welfare.”191  
The directions of the Indian Supreme Court were codified into 
CARA guidelines.  CARA perceives itself as having a “principle 
aim . . . to encourage in country adoption,” while also being 
“engaged in clearing inter country adoption of Indian children.”192 
Under CARA regulations, Indian agencies must receive 
recognition by CARA in order to either “give a child to foreign 
parents for the purpose of adoption” or to “submit an application to 
an Indian court under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, for 
declaring a foreigner as a guardian of an Indian child.”193  Indian 
agencies involved in foreign adoption also should be licensed by the 
State “under the provisions either of the Women and Children 
Institutions (Licensing) Act, 1956 or the Orphanages or Charitable 
Institutions (Supervision and Control) Act, 1960.”194  In addition, 
Indian agencies applying for recognition from CARA should have the 
recommendation of their state government for such work, although 
CARA may override a State’s refusal to recommend.195  CARA also 
grants “enlistment of foreign agencies,”196 and effectively determines 
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which foreign agencies may sponsor “applications of foreign adoptive 
parents for adopting an Indian child.”197  Both foreign agencies and 
Indian agencies should be run “on a non-commercial, non-profitable 
basis.”198 
CARA approves all foreign adoptions, as its regulations require 
the recognized Indian agency to “apply to CARA for getting a 
clearance for the child.”199  Approvals by CARA of specific placements 
are called “No Objection Certificates” (“NOC”).200  Indian courts 
cannot grant guardianship to foreign parents unless CARA has first 
granted the NOC, with the possible exception of circumstances 
where CARA has failed to respond to the application “within the time 
limit specified” in the guidelines.201 
In addition, CARA guidelines implement the Supreme Court’s 
directions for Voluntary Coordinating Agencies (“VCA”).202  Local 
VCAs are responsible for promoting adoption within India, and for 
issuing an NOC when efforts to place the child within India have 
been unsuccessful.203  The various local VCAs are themselves required 
“to seek recognition from CARA by means of an application which 
shall be routed through the State Government . . . .”204  The VCA 
review and issuance of an NOC precedes CARA review, and provides 
CARA with evidence that sufficient efforts to place a child within 
India were made. 
CARA guidelines similarly reflect the Supreme Court’s 
instructions regarding “scrutinising agencies.”205  The scrutinising 
agency is appointed by the local court reviewing the guardianship 
petition.  The Indian Council for Social Welfare and the Indian 
Council of Child Welfare may serve as scrutinising agencies; local 
courts may also appoint other entities as scrutinising agencies from 
those recognized by CARA for this purpose.206  Scrutinising agencies 
“should not be involved in the placement of children in adoption.” 207  
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Scrutinising agencies review all facets of the case, including issues 
pertaining to the voluntariness of the surrender of the child and the 
accuracy of the child study form.  Additionally, they ensure that 
adoptive parents are “really interested” in accepting special needs 
and older children and guard against illicit profiteering.  Also, they 
ensure proper clearances by VCA and CARA and determine whether 
the adoption is “in the best interests of the child.”208  Scrutinising 
agencies may charge for their review, with the ordinary rate 
amounting to approximately $10 to $11 per case for foreign cases, 
and a little more than $3 for Indian cases.209 
Although CARA plays a comprehensive regulatory role in 
relation to the other actors in Indian adoption, CARA has not 
fulfilled the Supreme Court’s expressed wish that it match 
prospective adoptive parents with Indian agencies and available 
children.  The Supreme Court of India had envisioned a system in 
which foreign agencies initiated their contacts with CARA, who in 
turn matched them with Indian agencies.210  Instead, foreign agencies 
and prospective adoptive parents generally make direct contact with 
Indian orphanages, which subsequently seek CARA approval for 
specific placements.  This direct contact between foreign and Indian 
agencies in arranging specific adoptions has been a mixed blessing, 
simultaneously creating opportunities for initiative, efficiency, and 
corruption.  A system in which all placements were based on matches 
or referrals made by CARA could have created a logjam at the center 
of the system and would only have avoided corruption if CARA itself 
had proven incorruptible. 
6. Analysis of the Indian Adoption System 
The most obvious feature of the Indian system for foreign 
adoptions is its bureaucratic layering of multiple institutions that 
must approve each adoption.  Within this system, CARA not only 
approves each foreign adoption, but also approves the Indian agency, 
foreign agency, VCA, and scrutinising agency involved in each 
adoption.  A foreign adoption usually only proceeds when all of these 
entities—Indian agency, foreign agency, CARA, VCA, scrutinising 
agency, and local court—in some manner approve the adoption.  In 
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addition, it would also be necessary to procure traveling permissions 
from immigration authorities.  The Indian government has thus 
added multiple layers of regulation to the basic procedures, under 
the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890, under which a local court 
reviews a guardianship petition.  These multiple layers of review often 
appear duplicative; for example, VCAs exist to ensure efforts to place 
a child within India, but the issuance of an approval (NOC) by the 
VCA is then subsequently reviewed by CARA, the scrutinising agency, 
and the local court.  Does it really take three entities to determine 
whether a prior entity approved an adoption? 
The tendency towards bureaucracy and multiple layers of 
approval may be typical of the way that the Indian government has 
traditionally functioned, particularly prior to recent liberalization of 
the economy.  While such a scheme may appear to provide multiple 
layers of safeguards against abuses in adoption, in the context of 
Indian society it may instead simply provide multiple layers of 
corruption.  Asha Bajpai, an Indian family law teacher writing about 
adoption in India, commented: 
The procedures involved in inter-country adoption are too 
complicated.  Though the intention is to screen the genuine cases 
the procedures give rise to a lot of bureaucracy. . . .  Bureaucratic 
controls, are too complex and hence there is a tendency towards 
violations.  Since checks and balances are done by Government 
officials there is a likelihood of a lot of corruption.211 
By creating a system where multiple institutions must approve 
each adoption, within the context of a system often suffering from 
corruption through bribery and personal connections, safeguards can 
instead become opportunities for abuse.  The system of adoption can 
become one where, in order to get an adoption through the system, 
an individual has to either have certain personal connections, or else 
be willing to “grease palms.”  Once it becomes apparent that 
approvals are based on such personal connections or monetary 
inducements, incentives to follow the rules may disappear. 
These possible difficulties with corruption are exacerbated by 
the introduction of foreign money into the system.  The per capita 
income within the United States is $35,060, while that of India is 
$480.212  A computer programmer working in the burgeoning 
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computer industries of Hyderabad, India, could expect to earn 
around $8000 annually, while a project manager might raise that 
figure to $11,000.213  Thus, amounts of money that might seem 
insignificant to American adoptive parents could be enormously 
corrupting in India. 
Some might argue that the use of bribes or personal connections 
to secure necessary approvals for adoptions within a society where 
such behavior is common does not necessarily distort the adoption 
system.  After all, within India it may sometimes be the case that a 
government official or agency personnel will demand extra payment 
for providing an entirely proper approval or service.  Such requests 
may be common within a system where persons with authority seek 
extra payments for performing their normal tasks as a means of 
supplementing their salary.  “Greasing” a system may simply cause it 
to perform its assigned task somewhat more quickly than would 
otherwise be the case.  Given the importance of time in the life of a 
child, and the negative effects upon the child’s welfare of delays in 
the adoption process, some might argue that “greasing” the system by 
whatever means are available is ethically defensible.  An adoption 
under such conditions, it could be argued, still accomplishes the 
fundamental good of placing an orphan within a suitable family.  
Others would argue that an otherwise proper adoption involving 
illicit payments to government actors or agencies could be 
characterized as a kind of trafficking in children, and thus 
fundamentally unethical. 
The corrupting power of money, however, goes far beyond the 
question of whether bribery ipso facto converts adoption into “baby-
selling” or trafficking.  Money not only speeds up the system, but also 
alters its fundamental workings.  The availability of large amounts of 
foreign money for foreign adoption can systematically tilt the system, 
at every stage, toward intercountry adoption.  The presence of money 
can subvert the fundamental principles of intercountry adoption, 
which favor the maintenance of the child within the birth family, 
where feasible, and favor in-country adoptive placement over 
intercountry adoption.  Because foreign money is available, Indian 
agencies may be transformed from social welfare organizations 
assisting families and orphans to foreign adoption profiteers scouting 
the countryside for children.  Instead of offering counseling, services, 
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or help designed to allow a child to remain within her birth family, 
agencies will systematically offer money to birth parents to induce 
relinquishment.  Agencies will thus go into the business of 
deliberately producing “paper” orphans, who when placed in foreign 
adoption become an immensely profitable product.  Similarly, 
obstacles to in-country adoption will be systematically constructed 
when proportionately huge amounts of money can be made for 
foreign placements.  Agencies will prefer to place a child out-of-
country and receive literally thousands of dollars—a year’s salary for a 
middle class Indian—rather than place the child in-country and 
receive less than $100.214  Thus, money subverts the basic principles of 
the CRC, Hague Convention, and Indian law. 
The combination of a system where permissions/approvals are 
commonly based on money or personal connections, with a large 
monetary incentive toward foreign adoptions, can lead to a 
systematically corrupt adoption system.  Money is used to procure 
approvals and false paperwork in questionable cases, not merely to 
speed proper approvals.  And within such a system, it can become 
virtually impossible to tell which adoptions were legitimate, and 
which were not, as the system may operate in largely the same way for 
both.  Both involve the use of personal connections or bribery for 
approvals, and both involve disproportionately large monetary 
incentives toward intercountry adoption.  The question of whether 
children really were orphans needing a home, or could have been 
placed in-country, can be obscured in a system already corrupted by 
the power of money and personal connections. 
Given the differential economic scales between the United States 
(and other receiving countries) and India, even the modest sums 
which the Indian government permits Indian agencies to recover for 
foreign adoptions could be corrupting.  The limits of $2.25 per day 
and $225 reimbursement for expenses215 are still substantially greater 
than what is available for in-country placements, and could in 
themselves tilt the system away from its principles disfavoring foreign 
placements.  On the other hand, it could be argued that there are 
unique costs applicable to foreign adoption that justify these higher 
reimbursements.  At present, however, the higher reimbursement 
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schedules for foreign adoption is insignificant compared to the other 
sources of foreign money that are coming into the system.  One 
obvious source is the permission under Indian law for “voluntary 
donations.”  The Supreme Court of India had specified that such 
sums were not to be paid until the child had traveled to the foreign 
country.216  In practice, it appears that such fees have provided a 
loophole by which to completely bypass the attempts under Indian 
law to limit the impact of foreign money on the adoption process. 
It has become commonplace for United States placement 
agencies, who deal directly with American parents, to charge foreign 
fees that are far higher than the maximum reimbursements.  Thus, 
while according to CARA regulations one would expect foreign fees 
of substantially less than $1000, it is far more common for such fees 
to fall within a range of $6500 to $12,500.217  One justification for 
such “foreign fees” lies in part in the concept of “voluntary 
donations.”  The difficulty, of course, is that a listed or required 
“donation” is not truly “voluntary.”  Other difficulties flow from the 
failure of United States placement agencies to break down their 
foreign fees.  The agencies may view some of those foreign or Indian 
fees as covering matters beyond the regulations of the Indian 
government, such as the costs United States agencies incur in 
operating a program in another country.  It is not clear how much of 
this money is paid to the Indian agencies in question, although 
estimates from the Andhra Pradesh scandal indicate that Indian 
agencies there were receiving between $2000 and $7000 per 
intercountry adoption.218  In addition, it is often unclear whether 
“donation” money actually goes to improve the orphanages in 
question, or simply enriches particular individuals.  These 
uncertainties make it very difficult to determine up front whether 
United States agencies are operating in literal conformity to Indian 
law, but also make it obvious that the behavior of United States 
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agencies can create the incentive and opportunity to violate the letter 
and spirit of the law.219 
Of course, beyond the issue of listed fees lies the possibility that 
foreign personnel are making covert payments to Indian agencies.  
Even modest payments by United States agencies to foreign agencies 
or others could be highly influential in securing the desired result: 
quick access to “legally” adoptable children.  This danger is 
exacerbated by the custom some United States agencies may have of 
paying country coordinators a “per case” fee, turning such 
coordinators into economic free agencies.  Thus, if a United States 
country coordinator were to “kick back” a modest portion of his or 
her own fee to an individual in India, it could be highly persuasive in 
securing favorable access to adoptable children. 
One might compare intercountry adoption between the United 
States and a developing nation like India to the problem the United 
States faces sharing a border with a developing nation like Mexico.  
The economic lure of the United States makes even substantial 
enforcement efforts entirely inadequate to the task of policing the 
border between the United States and Mexico.  In the context of 
adoption, however, while enforcement efforts have been historically 
quite lax the economic lure of violating the law is equally attractive. 
II.  THE STORY OF THE ANDHRA PRADESH ADOPTION SCANDALS 
A. Questions and Perspectives 
The story of the Andhra Pradesh adoption scandals is difficult to 
tell in large part because so many of the facts remain subject to 
significant dispute.  In addition, the various actors in the story—
United States adoption agencies, adoptive parents, older adoptees, 
Indian agencies and persons subject to investigation and legal action, 
Indian social justice activists, and various United States and Indian 
government officials—would likely tell the story in vastly different 
ways. 
At the heart of the scandals are claims of a systematic criminal 
conspiracy to obtain illicit profits from intercountry adoption.220  This 
conspiracy would subvert the governing legal standards for 
intercountry adoption at every turn.  Instead of making reasonable 
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efforts to keep children with their birth families, scouts would 
approach families and employ various means, including (but not 
limited to) the buying of children, to induce families to relinquish 
their children.221  Documents necessary to the processing of 
intercountry adoption, including relinquishments, identity papers 
and child study forms, refusals to adopt by prospective Indian 
adoptive parents, and death certificates of parents would be 
fabricated, falsified, or obtained under false pretenses.222  Prospective 
Indian adoptive parents would be pushed aside in favor of foreign 
adoptive parents.223  Indian legal principles requiring fees to be 
limited and “donations” to be voluntarily given after the child leaves 
India would be subverted by the requiring of fees and payments to 
Indian agencies and individuals far in excess of legal standards, and 
vastly disproportionate to normal pay scales for such work in India.  
The conspiracy, in short, would amount to buying Indian children for 
a pittance from impoverished and vulnerable Indian birth families, 
and selling them for a fortune (in Indian terms) to foreign adoptive 
families.224 
There has never been a comprehensive investigation by Indian 
or United States authorities as to the accuracy of such charges.  As we 
shall see, however, at various points in time government actors have 
given the charges substantial credence and acted, at least temporarily, 
as though the charges were true.  The failure of a systematic 
accounting of the accuracy or extent of the scandal has enabled 
differently situated actors to tell the story in vastly different ways. 
Apologists for intercountry adoption, including some United 
States agencies, Indian agencies, and foreign adoptive parents, might 
respond to the claims of a systematic criminal conspiracy as follows: It 
is true that one or two of the Indian orphanages were sloppy in their 
paperwork and may even have illegally acquired children for 
adoption.  It is true that some of these individuals were “in it for the 
money.”  It is probably also true that some poor birth parents were 
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paid some money.  However, India has literally millions of children in 
need of adoption due to abandonment, poverty, the shame associated 
culturally with illegitimate birth, and cultural discrimination against 
female children.  Indeed, female infanticide is prevalent in India.225  
In some instances, the female children who were “bought” for modest 
sums would otherwise have been victims of female infanticide.226  In 
other cases, the modest funds provided to birth families could be 
seen as an act of charity.  In any event, the need for intercountry 
adoption is clearly great.  In addition, adoption has not yet attained 
broad cultural acceptance in India, and the cultural burdens of 
raising a girl in India make it particularly unlikely that one could 
place female children within the country.  There simply are not 
adequate in-country adoptive families to meet the needs of India’s 
children.  It is true, of course, that there is a great deal of corruption 
in India,227 and therefore it is inevitable that some bribery and 
corruption is involved in processing adoption cases.  However, the 
cultural predominance of corruption in India is no reason to leave 
Indian children to suffer from infanticide, abandonment, starvation, 
living in the streets, being raised under horrific conditions in 
institutions, or other such fates.228 
Apologists for adoption from India may also assert that the 
scandal was politicized and exaggerated by Indian activists opposed to 
international adoption.  Many such apologists believe that some of 
the Indian orphanages implicated at later stages of the scandal were 
wrongly accused, or guilty only of the kinds of corruption necessary 
to accomplish the job of saving children within a society where 
corruption and bribery are ubiquitous. 
The specific factual disputes implicated by the conflicting views 
of the scandals are as follows: (1) Did the wrongdoing encompass 
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most or all of the Indian orphanages and agencies placing children 
for intercountry adoption, or did it only involve one or two?  (2) 
What percentage of the children being placed in intercountry 
adoption needed a family, and what percentage were “made orphans” 
for the purposes of profiting from adoption, but otherwise would 
have remained within their birth families?  (3) What percentage of 
the children placed in intercountry adoption could have been placed 
for adoption within India, if the proper efforts toward in-country 
adoption had been made?  (4) How many children’s lives were lost 
due to the placement of children in institutions, and how many lives 
were saved from infanticide? 
Alongside of these factual questions rests a difficult ethical 
dilemma, which can be described as the problem of the “second 
choice.”  Most would agree that the “first choice” for a system of 
intercountry adoption would embrace the ideals, principles, and laws 
that can be harmonized from international, Indian, and American 
law.  Such rules would guarantee that: (1) relinquishments were 
voluntary, and not induced or coerced; (2) reasonable efforts were 
made to keep children with their birth families; (3) in-country 
adoption was favored over intercountry adoption; (4) profiteering 
from adoption was eliminated; (5) decisions were made without 
regard to bribery or corruption.  It appears to many, however, that 
these broadly embraced principles are simply not attainable in many 
of the sending countries, such as India, Cambodia, and Guatemala.  
The issue then becomes one’s fall-back position, or second-choice.  
Many adoptive parents and agency personnel insist that the 
intercountry adoption system must be kept open and functioning 
despite even pervasive corruption violative of the fundamental 
principles of intercountry adoption.  They argue that the good of 
saving or helping individual children is the preeminent good, to be 
prioritized above all other norms implicated by adoption.  On this 
basis, shutdowns of individual countries are always opposed, and 
indeed any reforms that would slow down the processing of 
intercountry adoptions are found wanting.  The “second” choice of 
much of the intercountry adoption world, in short, is a corrupt 
system that continues to process adoptions, rather than a shutdown 
or slowdown of the current system.  By contrast, some would argue 
that if the fundamental principles that ethically validate intercountry 
adoption cannot be implemented, then the second-choice is to shut 
down or significantly slow down the current system.  They argue that 
the harms that a corrupt adoption system causes to children, birth 
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families, and adoptive families outweigh the good of ensuring the 
placement of individual children overseas.229 
The factual and values questions understandably become 
intertwined whenever there is an adoption scandal.  Those whose 
second choice is a corrupt adoption system will, of course, factually 
tend to minimize the scope and seriousness of the corruption 
involved.  In the end, however, it would seem that many would prefer 
a functioning and highly corrupt intercountry adoption system to a 
shutdown.  By contrast, those who perceive possible harms in even a 
cleanly run intercountry adoption are likely to seize upon any 
evidence of illegality as confirmation that the intercountry adoption 
system is pervasively corrupt and needs to be shut down. 
Beneath the conflict over the best second-choice lie ideological 
differences.  Ideologically, there are divisions over the desirability of 
intercountry adoption that parallel, to some degree, the debate 
within the United States over the placement of African-American 
children in white families.  For example, some—including adult 
adoptees—are beginning to voice concerns about placing Asian 
children in white families.  Concerns are raised that Asian children 
lose, or seek to suppress, their own Asian identities in the process of 
adapting to their adoptive, white families.230  Others express concern 
that intercountry adoption is another form of exploitation of poor or 
vulnerable nations by rich nations, comparable to colonialism, or 
exploitative forms of child trafficking.  From these ideological 
perspectives, intercountry adoption is suspect at best.  By contrast, 
others perceive adoption generally as a kind of “pro-life” good, and 
interracial or intercountry adoption as a way of practicing a positive 
form of diversity.  Thus, both “conservative” and “liberal” political 
values can lead to a generally positive ideological evaluation of 
intercountry adoption. 
Another set of ideological issues, with parallel versions under 
various political and religious perspectives, will also impact the choice 
of the second-best.  For many individuals of various political and 
religious perspectives, removing a child from a society can be justified 
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based on the propensity of that society to harm the child, due to the 
child’s gender, caste, socioeconomic status, religion, or race.  For 
example, both conservatives and liberals are shocked by the manner 
in which females in many societies suffer intense forms of 
discrimination, limitation, and perceived denigration literally from 
the womb to the grave.  Gender-selective abortion, female infanticide, 
and the gender-based denial of an education merely lead the list of 
well-publicized harms against girls in various non-Western societies.  
Generally “liberal and tolerant” individuals in rich, Western societies 
may be loathe to leave, or return, a female child to her fate within 
those societies, and thus see intercountry adoption as a compelling 
good, for it places the female child within a society where she can 
realize her potential.  Similarly, for some evangelical or 
fundamentalist Christians, removing a child from an overwhelmingly 
non-Christian culture into a Christian home may be a compelling 
spiritual good, for it can lead to the child’s eternal salvation.  These 
views, whether secular or religious, liberal or conservative, are 
problematic because they can virtually justify taking any child from 
his or her family, culture, nation, and people in order to achieve 
some greater secular or religious salvation.  Such views tend to be 
whispered, rather than shouted, because while they include some 
high ideals, they explicitly or implicitly involve sweeping 
denunciations of entire cultures, nations, peoples, and religions. 
The ways in which individuals characteristically think or solve 
problems also may impact the analysis of the second-best.  The 
difference parallels that between a public health or economics 
approach, which concentrates on global, demographic, and statistical 
effects, and that of a physician or social worker, who may concentrate 
on helping one individual or family at a time.  Those who 
characteristically analyze systemic effects will tend to perceive a 
corrupt adoption system as a self-perpetuating process, and will want 
to determine whether the system as a whole, if allowed to continue, 
will do more harm than good.231  Those who concentrate on the 
individual will see the good of intervening to “save” an individual 
child, or each individual child, as paramount, without even 
calculating the total impact of the system as a whole over time.232  The 
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possibility of leaving a child to his or her fate, in order to stop a 
corrupt system from operating, will seem highly immoral to some 
even if the system is in fact harming many children.233 
B. Chronological Narrative of the Andhra Pradesh Adoption Scandals 
The Andhra Pradesh adoption scandals can be presented as a 
chronology of increasingly serious, cyclical adoption scandals.  
Although it is possible to begin the story earlier, it is convenient to 
begin with the events of 1995–1996.  During that period a particular 
individual working in the United States embassy in Madras (now 
called Chennai), began to hold up intercountry adoptions based on 
suspicions of irregularities.  The suspicions centered around an 
orphanage called Action for Social Development (“ASD”), run by 
Sanjeeva Rao.  Prospective adoptive parents generally responded by 
continuing to seek the adoption and emigration of “their children.”  
It appears that eventually the children whose adoptions had been 
held up by the American embassy were granted visas and allowed to 
travel to the United States.  Some children were transferred away 
from ASD to other orphanages due to the allegations.234 
The next phase of the scandal broke in March and April of 1999, 
and once again involved Sanjeeva Rao and his orphanage, ASD.235  
This time, another individual, Peter Subbaiah, who ran the Good 
Samaritan Evangelical and Social Welfare Association, was also 
implicated.236  The primary accusation concerned buying babies from 
a tribal group called the Lambada.  The Lambada were a traditionally 
nomadic people, now settled into hamlets (called tandas) and 
surviving primarily through subsistence farming and farm labor, 
often under conditions of severe poverty.  The Lambada had 
previously practiced the custom of a bride price, but had adopted the 
culturally predominant Indian dowry system, which requires the 
family of the bride to pay a substantial sum to the groom’s family in 
order to arrange her marriage.237  In addition, the Lambada were said 
to believe that the third, sixth, and ninth child was, if a girl, 
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“inauspicious.”238  They were allegedly prone both to female 
infanticide, and also to selling, for very modest sums, some of their 
female infants.239  Press accounts in India referred to their “fair 
complexion” as making them more attractive to foreign parents,240 
although it is not clear whether this reflected Indian, rather than 
American, prejudices.241 
The 1999 scandals began with the arrest of two women who were 
alleged to be acting as scouts or intermediaries in the purchase of 
children.242  Although some reports styled these women as “social 
workers,”243 they were charged with buying Lambada infants for 
relatively small sums ($15 to $45), and then receiving significantly 
larger sums ($220 to $440) from the orphanages for the children.244  
Press reports indicated that the orphanages received $2000 to $3000 
for each child placed in intercountry adoption.245 
As a result of the 1999 scandals, Sanjeeva Rao and Peter 
Subbaiah were arrested and placed in prison.  The government 
conducted dramatic raids to “rescue” the children from the 
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orphanages, taking 172 children from Rao’s orphanage and 56 from 
Subbaiah’s orphanage, the vast majority from each being female.246  
The “rescue” of these children turned into a fiasco.  It is reported 
that ten children died shortly after being moved into government 
care.247  While some claimed the children died from preexisting 
conditions, others indicated that the fault was the government’s.  
Some suggested that the parade of government officials “visiting” the 
children had been a source of disease and infection.248  Efforts to 
reunite the children with their birth parents were generally 
unsuccessful, and it appeared that the Lambada parents generally did 
not want their children back.249  The government investigation 
allegedly revealed that most of the relinquishment documents were 
forged, with the signatures provided by thumb impressions of office 
attendants.  The documents were alleged to be generally fraudulent 
in regard to the identities and original locations of the children.250 
The scandal caused a severe temporary slowdown of adoptions 
from Andhra Pradesh, but eventually the flow of adoptions from the 
state resumed.  Sanjeeva Rao and Peter Subbiah were released from 
prison, apparently without ever being formally tried.  Rao eventually 
was able to reopen his orphanage.251  Scouts resumed buying children 
among the Lambada, although perhaps working with somewhat more 
discretion.  By the spring of 2000, a year after the scandal, there was a 
press report that the Lambadas were still selling their infants to “the 
same people who purchased children last year.”252  Government help 
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to ease the desperate plight of the Lambada apparently never 
appeared. 
A number of orphanages operating in 1999 had been left 
untouched by the scandal.  These included a Roman Catholic 
orphanage, Tender Loving Care (“TLC”), run by an Indian nun, 
Sister Maria Theresa; an evangelical Christian orphanage, John 
Abraham Bethany Memorial, operated by a Christian couple, 
Mahender and Savitri Kumar; another Christian orphanage, Precious 
Moments, operated by Anita Sen, wife of a Director General of 
Police; and a Hindu orphanage, Guild of Service.  Many foreign 
agencies chose to continue working in Andhra Pradesh, or even to 
open new programs there, apparently based on the relatively quick 
and successful processing of cases there.  For example, in December 
2000 a large Canadian adoption agency, Children of the World, 
announced that it had reached an understanding with two 
orphanages in Andhra Pradesh, apparently including the Bethany 
orphanage.  A four member Canadian delegation visited India, the 
delegation including one Indo-Canadian.  A Canadian government 
official commented that the two orphanages had been investigated to 
ensure “there is no trafficking of children and it is not a profit-
making organization as our ethics are very strict.”  The Canadian 
official noted their demand for a “strict code of ethics,” and their 
satisfaction that, “[t]he way they adopt children in India is pretty 
strict for us.”253 
About three months later, in late March and early April 2001, a 
new adoption scandal flared up in Andhra Pradesh.  The scandal 
began with the March 22, 2001, arrest of Christopher Vinod, who was 
traveling by car with three infants.254  The case also involved the 
adjoining State of Karnataka, located to the west of Andhra Pradesh.  
A large number of Lambada had settled in a poverty-stricken area 
that lay along the Andhdra Pradesh–Karnataka border, and Vinod 
identified two of the children with him as having come from the 
Karnataka side of the border.  Vinod implicated Sister Maria Teresa’s 
TLC orphanage, as well as the Bethany orphanage, in a scheme of 
purchasing infants from the Lambada for placement in intercountry 
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adoption.255  It appeared that a split had arisen among various groups 
involved in these practices, in part arising from the divorce of the 
Kumars, who had operated the Bethany orphanage.  Savitri Kumar 
retained the orphanage, while her ex-husband, Mahender, allegedly 
was working with Peter Subbiah and/or Sanjeeva Rao.  Some claimed 
that a rivalry between the two groups caused the arrests.  The 
immediate results, however, were apparently dramatic for both 
groups.256 
On April 6, government authorities came to arrest Savitri.  She 
reportedly told them that she was going to offer prayers, and then 
slipped out a back door.257  Charges were filed against her, and the 
government issued increasingly large rewards for information leading 
to her capture.  Police raided her orphanage, and “rescued” sixty 
children, moving them to government orphanages and hospitals.258  
Sensational charges developed from a report that one of the children 
was missing corneas from both eyes, leading to speculation they had 
been harvested from the child for sale.259  Lurid reports of graveyards 
of dead babies also emerged,260 along with related claims that Savitri 
had altered identities of infants, taking the identities of the dead for 
the living.261 
Press reports indicate that there was at least one child reunited 
with her birth family.  Sahvi Begum, a three-year-old child who had 
been in Savitri’s Bethany home, was discovered among the “rescued” 
children in the government home by her parents.262  Six months 
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earlier, Sahvi’s family had reported her missing and filed a police 
complaint.  Her reunion with her family produced some poignant 
drama, as the government home initially refused to release her to her 
parents, even when they came a second time accompanied by a 
member of the legislature and the press.  The child rushed to 
embrace her mother upon spotting her, but the government workers 
separated them.  The government home had the legislator placed in 
prison, although she was later released.  The press reported that the 
child was finally reunited with her mother after “completion of 
requisite formalities.”263  Given the degree of corruption in India, one 
wonders if those “formalities” could have included some kind of 
bribe.  The press did not resolve the mystery of how Sahvi Begum 
ended up in the Bethany orphanage, but the reports were indicative 
of fraud: the orphanage had renamed her “Reena,” and in “adoption 
papers . . . declared her as an orphan.”264  Begum’s Bethany-prepared 
paperwork stated that she had been a resident of the Bethany 
orphanage since 1999, despite the fact that she had lived with her 
family until late 2000.265  Thus, it appeared that the Bethaney 
orphanage had created a false name and history in order to prepare 
her for adoption. 
Children of the World, the large Canadian adoption agency that 
had started an India program in December 2000, reportedly had 
fifteen couples in the process of adopting a child from the Bethany 
orphanage when the scandal closed the orphanage.  The agency 
publicly defended Savitri and her orphanage, claiming Savitri would 
not have bought children because an average of ten children were 
“left on her balcony every day.”266  Nonetheless, the province of 
Quebec suspended adoptions from India due to the scandal.267 
Authorities subsequently arrested Sanjeeva Rao again, and 
raided his reopened Action for Social Development orphanage.  
Thirty-four children were taken from ASD; twenty-two were 
transferred to Sishu Vihar (the government orphanage), and twelve 
were hospitalized.268 
The scandal spread further when authorities arrested Anita Sen, 
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who operated the orphanage Precious Moments, on the grounds of 
an evangelical Christian Bible school.269  The press made much of the 
fact that Sen’s husband was prominent within the police 
department.270 Initially, one of the primary charges against Sen was 
that she lacked the CARA registration necessary to place children in 
intercountry adoption.271  Her defense was apparently that she had 
the proper registration within Andhra Pradesh to run an orphanage, 
and was lawfully routing her adoptions through the Indian Council of 
Social Welfare, a CARA-approved organization.272  Sen’s lack of CARA 
registration thus presented the issue of the networking of non-CARA 
child welfare organizations with CARA-approved organizations.  
Under the rules of the Indian Supreme Court, it would seem that 
such networking was only legal if the child was physically moved to 
the CARA-approved organization.273  While this issue could be seen as 
more a matter of technical compliance than fundamental ethics, 
other more serious charges against Sen emerged.  It has been 
claimed that Sen had taken a variety of older children under false 
pretenses, including offers to educate the child, or provide the 
mother with a job, and instead had fraudulently changed the child’s 
name, identity, or status, and offered the child for intercountry 
adoption.274  Thus, while Sen was seen by some as helping others out 
of Christian conviction, anti-international-adoption activists claimed 
that she was stealing children from their families in order to profit 
from hefty foreign adoption fees. 
Indian press reports of the 2001 scandal were generally critical 
of the state government of Andhra Pradesh.  It was obvious to most 
that the government had failed to respond adequately to the 1999 
scandals, particularly since the 2001 scandals involved precisely the 
same charges, and some of the same individuals and orphanages.275  
The propensity of the government to take short-term measures 
against such scandals, while ultimately allowing the same abusive 
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practices to resume within a few months, was repeatedly noted by the 
press.276  Thus, the government came under some pressure to prove 
that it would finally do something about the adoption scandals that 
would stop their reoccurrence.277 
The Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh at that time, 
Chandrababu Naidu, is particularly well-known in the West, where he 
has an enviable reputation as the CEO of Indian politicians.278  Naidu 
has carefully groomed an international image as a businessman–
statesman, who governs Andhra Pradesh via his laptop, while making 
Andhra Pradesh’s capital city, Hyderabad, into “Cyberabad,” an 
international center for information technology (“IT”).279  Naidu’s 
reputation stemmed from his advocacy of a certain kind of 
globalization for Andhra Pradesh, whereby the workings of 
government would be modernized through the use of IT, and the 
government would nurture the growth of a globally-connected, 
private IT industry.  Naidu has associated himself with major Western 
figures like Bill Gates and Bill Clinton, while forming strong alliances 
with international organizations such as the World Bank.280 
Naidu’s critics complain that his pro-globalization policies have 
not benefited the majority of the people of Andhra Pradesh, who 
remain poor farmers or laborers.  From this perspective, Naidu has 
sold out his people to wealthy foreign interests.281  Given the populist 
tenor of Indian politics, where politicians often try to win office by 
promising the masses government largess, Naidu’s international 
connections and pro-business economic policies left him politically 
vulnerable.  (Indeed, Naidu later would be swept from power in the 
May 2004 elections.)282  Naidu was presumably quite unhappy about 
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the recurrent intercountry adoption scandals, which could serve to 
remind voters of a particular ugly aspect of globalization: the sale of 
poor Indian children to rich foreign families. 
In April 2001, Naidu’s government announced a series of actions 
apparently intended to evidence a comprehensive approach to 
addressing abusive adoption practices.  The government decree 
banned the relinquishment of children on the “grounds of poverty, 
number of children and unwanted girl[s].”283  Procedures for 
handling “abandonments” of children were also altered.284  Thus, 
Naidu hoped to prevent abuses of two major legal means by which 
children become eligible for adoption—relinquishment and 
abandonment.  In typical fashion, Naidu proposed “computerization” 
of all adoption records, and the development of software “to monitor 
all cases and bring transparency.”285  The reward on Savitri’s head 
rose from around $2200 to over $11,000.  More than $110,000 was 
authorized for the care of the almost 200 children who had been 
taken from the orphanages.  Selected Lambada boys and girls were to 
be trained to carry to the Lambada hamlets a government script on 
adoption, to be performed in the Lambada langauge and employing 
song and dance.  A meeting of police superintendents and collectors 
in the affected districts was proposed to discuss the problems and 
circumstances causing the sale of girl children, and means for 
“effective control.”  The Government would restore the rescued 
children “to their biological parents if they can be traced.”286 
The government’s actions must be seen in the context of the 
activists, who emerged through the various Andhra Pradesh adoption 
scandals as opponents of intercountry adoption.  These anti-
intercountry-adoption activists were an apparently loosely organized 
collection of social activists, with a background of working on behalf 
of women, the poor, tribals, dalits, or labor unions.  For the activists, 
intercountry adoption had become another form of the familiar 
problem of the exploitation of the vulnerable by the powerful.  They 
further viewed intercountry adoption as another form of 
“trafficking.”  The activists were effective in putting pressure on the 
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government to act against intercountry adoption, and in working to 
influence public opinion.287 
A primary point of conflict developed over the fate of the 
children seized from the orphanages.  The Andhra Pradesh activists 
worked energetically to prevent any of these children from being 
placed out of the country, claiming that they should either be 
returned to their birth families or else adopted within India.  By 
contrast, many Western prospective adoptive parents who had been 
matched with particular children, and had passed to varying degrees 
through the many stages of Indian adoption, sought to “bring their 
children home,” as they sometimes (and controversially) put it.  
Although the government claimed to allocate substantial sums to the 
care of the “rescued” children, many Westerners regarded Sishu 
Vihar, the government orphanage, as a hell-hole.288  Each side 
demonized the other.  The Western “parents” considered the activists 
cruel ideologues willing to sacrifice the children for the sake of their 
cause.  The activists considered the Western “parents” selfish, rich, 
and privileged foreigners who thought their money and skin color 
could buy them Indian children.289 
The children caught in the middle included some who had been 
seized from the orphanages in the spring of 1999, along with those 
seized from the orphanages in 2001.  The most publicized case, at 
least in the West, was that of “Haseena.”290  Haseena was born in July 
1999 and allegedly relinquished by her mother to Sister Teresa 
Marie’s TLC orphanage in January 2000.  Haseena’s adoption by 
Sharon Van Epps and her husband, John Clements, an American 
couple in their mid-thirties, was approved by CARA on March 23, 
2001, just as the 2001 adoption scandal was breaking.  Sharon Van 
Epps came to India and met Haseena about a year later, in the spring 
of 2002, when Haseena was a little more than two and a half years 
old.  Describing the moment when she first met Haseena, Sharon 
Van Epps noted, “I felt like something I’d been missing my whole life 
that I didn’t even know I’d been missing had been found.”291  Sharon 
Van Epps then began the long vigil of remaining in India, visiting 
Haseena regularly, and working actively to get Haseena’s adoption 
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approved.  On May 28, 2003, the State moved Haseena from the TLC 
orphanage to the government orphanage, Sithu Vihar, and 
subsequently began denying Sharon Van Epps visitation.292 
The family court in Hyderabad denied the guardianship petition 
of the Van Epps, and the case was eventually appealed to the High 
Court of Andhra Pradesh.293  The court issued an extensive opinion, 
which had the effect of affirming the family court’s denial of 
guardianship.294  The court’s far-ranging opinion indicated that the 
state’s highest court generally credited the accusations against 
adoption agencies operating in Andhra Pradesh.295  In regard to 
Haseena, the court noted that the attorney for the Van Epps 
conceded violations of the Indian adoption guidelines.296  In addition, 
the High Court appeared to believe that Haseena had been 
misrepresented as having a deformed foot in order to procure the 
necessary “refusals to adopt” by prospective Indian adopters.297  The 
court refused to accept the argument that the principles of equity 
supported the granting of the guardianship.  Noting the claims that 
the Van Epps had themselves done nothing wrong, and had bonded 
to the child after receiving CARA approval,298 the court stated that 
accepting that argument would be “giving seal of approval to the 
fraud played by the placement agencies and the casual approach of 
approval . . . by the officials of VACA and CARA.”299  The court noted 
that, “on previous occasions also, large scale violations committed by 
the placement agencies in case of inter-country adoptions came to 
light.  But the Government instead of taking remedial measures 
allowed the malpractices to go on unabated.”300  The court then 
noted that “[t]he society welcomes such agencies which come 
forward to render help to the society, though not at their cost, but 
they can never be allowed to become business centers for extracting 
as much money as possible, which amounts to granting license to 
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those agencies for trafficking in Indian children.”301 
The court’s refusal to allow an equitable exception for the Van 
Epps did not merely rest on a need to respond vigorously to the 
wrongdoing of the agencies.  In addition, the court specifically 
rejected the argument that the “prospective foreign parents” were 
completely innocent.  The court criticized the parents for employing 
“backdoor methods in securing the child,” and implied that upon 
learning of the “fraud” they should have “walked out of the muddle 
and . . . allowed the law of the land to be implemented.”302  Thus, 
instead of crediting the parent’s long vigil and elaborate efforts to 
obtain custody of Haseena, the court suggested it would have been 
more ethical to leave the mess behind, leaving the Indian laws and 
legal system to deal with the situation. 
The Andhra Pradesh High Court questioned the assumption 
that Haseena would be better off in the United States: 
In India the marriage is considered sacrosanct, while it is a 
contract in western countries.  Stable and secure family life is a 
remote possibility in those countries.  It is on record that these 
foreign parents are willing to adopt female children only, but not 
male children.  If the marriage between the adoptive parents 
breaks down, it is not known what will happen to the child.  In 
fact, we repeatedly asked the counsel appearing for CARA and 
VACA whether any study was made with regard to the welfare of 
the children adopted by foreign parents, but we could not get any 
reply.303 
The court was similarly unimpressed with the argument that the TLC 
was a religious organization serving the poor: 
It is submitted . . . that the . . . agency is being run by Nuns 
without expecting any monetary benefit and they are doing their 
best to serve the destitute, abandoned and relinquished 
children. . . .  [W]e are constrained to observe that the Nuns who 
relinquished the world and who dedicated themselves for the 
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service of society are also getting influenced by the unethical 
methods adopted by certain agencies who made their institutions 
as business centers and we do not wish to further comment except 
saying that [the] agency did not conform to the guidelines for the 
reasons best known to them.304 
The court’s willingness to rule against the Van Epps may have 
been influenced by the presence, before the court, of prospective 
Indian adoptive parents.  Thus, the case was presented not as a 
question of whether Haseena would remain an orphan, but rather as 
a kind of custody battle between prospective American and Indian 
adoptive parents.  Haseena was presented, both before the court and 
in the press, as caught between India and America, with the court’s 
decision being in part a question of which nation was a more fit place 
to be raised.  Thus, ironically, an intercountry adoption case, which is 
usually seen (in the West) as about providing homes for otherwise 
abandoned or relinquished orphans, was presented as more of a 
traditional child custody dispute.  Haseena’s problem—the reason 
she was remaining in Sishu Vihar—was not that no one wanted her, 
but rather that too many people wanted her.305  Under these 
circumstances, it would have been difficult for the court to have ruled 
in favor of the Van Epps, for the implication would have been that an 
Indian child wanted by Indian parents was better off leaving India for 
America. 
In addition, the court’s opinion evidences a desire to send a 
clear message against profiteering and corruption in intercountry 
adoption.  The lack of follow-through in the prosecution of the 
offending agencies meant that the appellate courts in India were 
largely left with cases like Haseena’s as their opportunity to act 
against corruption in intercountry adoption.  Perhaps if the High 
Court had been given other opportunities to act against intercountry 
adoption, it might have been less inclined to use the Haseena case to 
send a clear message.  At the same time, the court could act against 
intercountry adoption in the Haseena case, and still believe that 
Haseena herself would not be harmed, but indeed would ultimately 
be placed with an appropriate Indian family. 
Despite the court’s statement that the Van Epps should have 
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walked away from the “muddle,”306 the last part of the court’s opinion 
evidenced some respect for Sharon Van Epps’ motherly love of  
Haseena.  The court specifically recited the equitable consideration 
that Sharon Van Epps had been staying in Hyderabad for eighteen 
months and had “developed so much love and affection towards the 
minor girl.”307  Noting that the Indian applicant seeking to adopt 
Haseena had “represented . . . [that] he is not particular to adopt . . . 
Haseena only,”308 the court left it to the authorities below to possibly 
consider a new petition from the Van Epps to adopt Haseena, 
assuming that “there are no other Indian parents who are willing to 
adopt this child . . . [and] the guidelines are scrupulously followed.”309  
Thus, while the High Court affirmed the family court’s denial of the 
Van Epps’ petition, it kept the door theoretically open to the filing of 
a new petition. 
From the Van Epps point of view, the court’s openness to a new 
petition may have seemed like a cruel gesture.  Why deny this petition 
and then speak of starting over again, while Haseena languished in 
Sishu Vihar?  Moreover, it should have been clear to all involved that 
the activists would ensure that there would always be Indian families 
seeking to adopt Haseena, giving her prominence as a test case.310  
Thus, the conditions for reopening the case seemed exceedingly 
unlikely to occur.  In fact, after the Haseena case, the Indian press 
increasingly publicized the existence of hundreds of Indians waiting 
to adopt children in Andhra Pradesh, who were being discouraged 
from doing so by overly strict guidelines or simple foot-dragging by 
the authorities.  Despite the Western understanding that Indians 
would not want to adopt—and especially would not want to adopt 
girls—it appeared from the Indian press that there was a pent-up 
demand within Andhra Pradesh to adopt children, both male and 
female.311  Ironically, it turned out that Indians were being subjected 
to stricter requirements than foreigners, which had the effect of 
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artificially suppressing adoption of Indian children within India.  For 
example, Indians seeking to adopt faced requirements of infertility or 
childlessness, or were denied access to the range of children available 
for adoption.  In addition, the income requirements applied to 
Indian applicants had the affect of rendering the majority of Indian 
families in Andhra Pradesh ineligible to adopt.  Thus, many families 
who could, in Indian terms, provide reasonably well for a child, were 
considered ineligible to adopt.  Despite these roadblocks, there were 
apparently hundreds of Indian parents in Andhra Pradesh formally 
registered and waiting to adopt.  Thus, the activists pressed the 
authorities to speed up their processing of adoptions by Indians, and 
particularly to place the contested children remaining in Sishu Vihar. 
Haseena was eventually placed with an Indian family in 2003, 
after the Van Epps had exhausted their appeals.312  The activists 
pointed to her placement, and that of many others of the “rescued” 
children, with Indian parents, as evidence that there were indeed 
Indian homes available for the children, if only the corrupting power 
of foreign money could be eliminated.  Many Western parents 
continued to assume, however, that intercountry adoption was 
necessary to meet the needs of Indian children.  Some pointed to the 
willingness of Americans to adopt special needs and older children, 
and argued that these children, at least, could not be placed for 
adoption within India.  Some American agencies, however, began to 
publicize what they characterized as a new openness to domestic 
adoption within India, even noting that this new development was 
causing a reduction in the numbers of children available for 
intercountry adoption.313 
The fallout of the Andhra Pradesh scandal continued into 2004, 
as Indian children continued to be subjects of custody battles 
between prospective foreign parents and the activists.  Like other 
bitter custody disputes, the parties were often unwilling to 
compromise and yet each blamed the other for extending the 
struggle.  The extensions of the struggles were particularly 
unfortunate for the children, as it generally meant that they 
remained in either Sishu Vihar, or else in a private orphange.  The 
unwillingness to compromise was likely heightened by each side’s 
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lack of authority to enter into a binding settlement determining the 
fate of the children.  Unlike a traditional custody dispute, where a 
father and mother could agree on custody issues and be confident of 
court approval, neither the prospective adoptive parents nor the 
activists had real authority to settle the cases.  If the prospective 
adoptive parents withdrew their petitions or failed to appeal, they 
would become legal strangers to the child they had sought to adopt, 
and would have no assurance that the child would be placed in a 
good home.  The prospective adoptive parents could reasonably fear 
that the children would be subject to political or bureaucratic delays 
dooming them to grow up in orphanages, or would be placed in 
inappropriate homes with those who came forward to adopt just to 
make a political point.  Since the activists did not control the 
governmental processes, they could not guarantee a positive outcome 
in the cases, however much they believed that such outcomes were 
possible in India.  Similarly, if the activists stopped fighting against 
the granting of guardianship to the foreign parents, they had no way 
of knowing what happened to the children.  While the activists’ fears 
that the children would fare badly in America or other rich nations 
seemed ludicrous to the foreign parents, those fears had been 
echoed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, and were apparently real.  
Moreover, the harm of a child being sent to America, while Indian 
prospective parents waited in vain for children to adopt, could not be 
remedied if children were placed in foreign homes. 
Unfortunately, the fears of the activists for the fate of children 
sent to America were accentuated by the case of a three-year-old girl 
named Priyamvada, who was under the care of Sister Teresa’s TLC 
orphanage.  An American woman named Gail Hunt had obtained 
approval from CARA prior to April 2001, but the family court refused 
guardianship (as in Haseena’s case).  As in Haseena’s case, an Indian 
couple selected the child for adoption, but the case was stalled as the 
foreign adoption petition was appealed.  Gail Hunt had originally 
applied to adopt Priyamvada as a single mother, but in the interim 
she married an individual named Steven Showcatally.  Unfortunately, 
in March 2004, as the appeal was still pending, Showcatally was 
charged with homicide in the death of the couple’s adopted 
Guatamalan toddler, Gustavo.314 
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The reported facts evidenced a classic and fatal case of battered 
child syndrome involving serious head injuries.  On Tuesday, March 
16, 2004, Showcatally brought Gustavo home from daycare, and 
became frustrated with the child’s diarrhea, which required him to 
repeatedly bath and change the boy, who was soiling his clothes and 
towels.  Showcatally called Hunt on the telephone, and reported to 
her that there had been an accident in the tub and that Gustavo’s 
head was swelling.  Hunt reportedly told Showcatally to meet him at 
the hospital.  Gustavo was brought to the operating room shortly after 
arrival, but died that evening.  When investigators pointed out that 
the child’s injuries were inconsistent with Showcatally’s story that he 
had dropped the boy once while washing him in the tub, he admitted 
that he had dropped the child twice more intentionally, after the 
accidental drop.  Showcatally reported that he had called his wife 
when he noticed that “the baby’s eyes were twitching and rolling back 
in his head.”315 
Oddly, TLC pushed for an emergency hearing regarding Gail 
Hunt’s petition to adopt Priyamvada around April 1, 2004, less than 
two weeks after the death of Hunt’s son Gustavo.  The story of 
Gustavo’s death, and the link to Gail Hunt and the Priyamvada case, 
broke in the Indian press a few days later.  Somebody had located the 
United States news stories about the death of Gustavo, which 
included Gail Hunt’s name, and made the connection.  The Indian 
press appeared indignant that TLC and/or Hunt would seek to push 
the adoption of Priyamvada forward under such circumstances.  The 
assumption of the Indian press seemed to be that there had been an 
attempt to sneak the case through without informing the authorities 
in India of this change in Hunt’s home situation.316  After the story 
broke in India, Sister Teresa announced that she was withdrawing the 
petition for foreign adoption.  Sister Teresa’s claim was apparently 
that this was in response to the death of Gustavo, rather than in 
response to the negative publicity.  Sister Teresa then told the press 
she would be releasing the child for in-country adoption, with the 
suggestion that the child be placed with relatives of one of the nuns, 
who wanted to adopt her.  The activists, however, had their own 
candidates, a couple who had earlier come forward to adopt the 
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child.317  Thus, the battle over Priyamvada would continue as the 
agency and activists recommended different Indian adoptive families.  
Sister Teresa did not explain why it was so easy to find a domestic 
adoptive placement now, despite the legal determination several 
years earlier, when Priyamvada was much younger and hence more 
adoptable, that there were no such placements available. 
As the aftermath of the scandal continued into 2004, the family 
court was consistently denying guardianship petitions for the 
“rescued” or pipeline children.  It became increasingly unlikely that 
any of these children would be leaving India for adoptive placements, 
and increasingly clear that litigating the cases would do no more than 
further delay domestic placements.  In the meantime, the system of 
processing new cases of intercountry adoption out of Andhra Pradesh 
became effectively shut down.  No approvals for adoptions from the 
state were granted by CARA during the one-year period from August 
2003 through July 2004, presumably because the requests were not 
being made.318  Apparently, even the Guild of Service, an orphanage 
apparently untouched by the scandals, virtually ceased placing 
children outside of India. 
The odd demographic picture of Indian adoption continued 
after the closing of intercountry adoptions from Andhra Pradesh.  
Andhra Pradesh adoptions have varied sharply over the last ten years.  
During the period from 1991 to 1993, Andhra Pradesh had been a 
fairly insignificant state for intercountry adoption, placing only 119 
children (an average of forty per year) over that three-year period.  
Even then, however, the dysfunctional official domestic adoption 
system had fallen behind the scant intercountry adoption numbers, 
with only seventy-six domestic adoptions over the same three-year 
period.319  By the year 2000, the year sandwiched between the two 
major Andhra Pradesh adoption scandals, Andhra Pradesh was 
placing around 200 children in a single year, placing second among 
all Indian states.320  Now, post scandal, Andhra Pradesh is not placing 
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any children internationally.  By contrast, Maharashtra, which 
includes the famous city of Bombay (now called Mumbai) and 
borders Andhra Pradesh, has been consistently a leader in Indian 
intercountry adoption statistics.321  Although the state represents 
approximately 9% of India’s population,322 during the year 2000, and 
again in the one-year period ending July 31, 2004, Maharashtra was 
responsible for approximately 40% of all intercountry adoptions.323  
Even more intriguing, the relatively small city of Pune, located in 
Maharashtra, which represents between 2.5% and 3.75% of India’s 
population,324 accounts for approximately one-quarter of all 
intercountry adoptions.325  Oddly, despite these comparatively high 
numbers of foreign placements out of Maharashtra, the Indian press 
reported a shortage of children available for domestic adoption 
within the state.326  In the meantime, the activists apparently hoped 
that they could build on their work in Andhra Pradesh, and achieve 
their goal of a nationwide moratorium on intercountry adoption.327 
 
 
 321 See BAJPAI, ADOPTION LAW, supra note 96, at 177–79 (Maharashtra represented 
one-third of all official adoptions—domestic and intercountry—during period from 
1991 to 1993, including 12% of all intercountry adoptions). 
 322 See OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN., CENSUS OF INDIA 2001: PROVISIONAL 
POPULATION TOTALS: MAHARASHTRA, at http://www.censusindia.net/profiles/ 
mah.html (created Apr. 4, 2001). 
 323 See BAJPAI, CHILD RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 42 (517 of 1364, or 37.9%, in 2000); 
supra note 318. 
 324 See OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN., CENSUS OF INDIA 2001: CITIES WITH MORE 
THAN ONE MILLION POPULATION, at http://www.censusindia.net/results/ 
millioncities.html (created Sept. 13, 2001) (2001 population of Pune—2,540,069); 
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN., CENSUS OF INDIA 2001: URBAN 
AGGLOMERATIONS/CITIES HAVING POPULATION OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION IN 2001, at 
http://www.censusindia.net/results/miilion_plus.html (created July 25, 2001) (2001 
population of Pune greater metropolitan area—3,755,525); OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR 
GEN., CENSUS OF INDIA 2001: PROVISIONAL POPULATION TOTALS: INDIA, at 
http://www.censusindia.net/results/resultsmain.html (created Apr. 5, 2001) (2001 
population of India—1,027,015,247). 
 325 See supra note 318 (23.6% in one year period ending July 31, 2004). 
 326 See Roli Srivastava, Adoption Agencies Faced with Shortage of Children, THE TIMES OF 
INDIA, Mar. 13, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 327 See Katz, supra note 231, at 1A (stating that the goal of activist Gita Ramaswamy 
is to shut down all intercountry adoptions in India within two years). 
 2005 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 475 
 
 
III.  REFORMING INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BRINGING PRACTICE INTO 
ROUGH CONFORMITY WITH LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS 
A. Intercountry Adoption Is Not a Self-Regulating, Self-Correcting 
System328 
The ongoing Indian adoption scandals illustrate the persistent 
gap between law and practice.  The difficulty is not merely that there 
are abuses, but rather that under the current system the abuses can 
become systematic.  It is not merely that there are systematic abuses, 
but that most of the affected parties are in some manner “bought off” 
into accepting the system despite those abuses.  Upon examination, it 
seems clear that most of the parties involved in intercountry adoption 
possess strong motivations to favor even a systematically abusive 
adoption system over no system at all.  Thus, intercountry adoption is 
not a self-regulating or self-correcting system.  This principle can be 
demonstrated by analyzing the respective roles of the various parties 
to intercountry adoption. 
1. United States Agencies Possess Financial and 
Ideological Incentives to Bring Children to the United 
States, Regardless of Allegations of Abuse 
United States agencies involved in intercountry adoption possess 
strong financial and ideological incentives to keep cases flowing 
through the pipeline, regardless of credible allegations of abuse.  
Financially, agencies depend on successfully moving children from 
other countries to the United States.  Ideologically, while agencies 
typically pay lip service to the legal preferences for maintaining 
children in their country of origin, many well-meaning agency 
personnel are strongly committed to the goal of “saving children” 
through adoption.  Thus, from the agency perspective the goal of 
correcting abuses, even where honestly accepted as a positive value, 
almost always gives way to the higher value, financial and ideological, 
of keeping children moving through the system.  United States 
agency personnel generally do not appear to report their knowledge 
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of irregularities and abuses to the authorities, and may even use 
various means to try to prevent or discourage adoptive parents from 
sharing their own knowledge of improprieties.  United States agency 
personnel are financially or ideologically motivated to “believe the 
best,” doubt negative reports, minimize abuses, and keep the system 
open and running at all costs even when abuses become apparent. 
These propensities are well illustrated in the Andhra Pradesh 
adoption scandal.  Although a detailed examination of agency 
behavior is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems evident that 
United States agencies played no role in reporting, reducing, ending, 
or limiting systematic corruption within the Andhra Pradesh 
adoption system.  Instead, agencies were willing to continue placing 
children out of Andhra Pradesh so long as the Indian and American 
government authorities were willing to continue processing cases.  
While there is no way to account for the numbers of purchased, 
kidnapped, or improperly relinquished children who were “placed” 
for adoption by United States agencies, the numbers seem to have 
been significant.  The numbers apparently would have been 
substantially higher, if not for the sporadic intervention of Indian 
authorities.  United States adoption agencies were either unwitting or 
witting parties to trafficking in children.  Significantly, despite the 
scandals, United States agencies only stopped accepting new referrals 
for placements after the system itself closed down, after the 2001 
scandals.  Moreover, there is no evidence that a single United States 
agency has ever taken any significant action to report, prevent, or 
remedy the many instances of corrupt adoption practices to which 
they have been witting or unwitting parties. 
To this day, United States agencies continue to advertise to 
prospective United States parents foreign fees and orphanage 
“donation” sums which appear contrary to both the letter and spirit 
of Indian law.329  This willingness to violate the letter and spirit of the 
law is not a mere technicality, as it is precisely the presence of 
inordinate sums of money that create the incentives and conditions 
within India to profiteer from adoption.330  Although it may be Indian 
agencies and individuals who have been most directly involved in 
improperly obtaining children for adoption, it is Western dollars that 
 
 329 See supra note 217. 
 330 See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 214, at 49 (noting that while private orphanages 
received between $12 and $25 for domestic adoptions, Peter Subbaiah “and the like” 
were receiving $2500 to $5000 per adoption from the United States and other 
countries, an “obvious motivation in their illegal actions”). 
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have provided the incentives that fuel systematic adoption 
corruption.  Although United States agencies may not intentionally 
buy or traffic in children, they are responsible for systematically 
creating monetary incentives that fuel the purchase and sale of 
children under the guise of adoption.331 
 The current system of adoption virtually guarantees that 
United States agencies will continue to fuel abusive adoption 
practices.  Within a largely unregulated system of adoption, the 
agencies willing to overlook or even participate in abusive adoption 
corruption practices will remain and “succeed” in securing significant 
numbers of adoptions.  Agencies concerned about corruption will 
tend to leave or avoid abuse-prone situations, such as those present in 
India, Guatemala, or Cambodia,332 leaving the field to those willing to 
play the game and do whatever it takes to “bring the children home.”  
Within abuse-prone areas, agencies that deal with corrupt 
orphanages and facilitators who illegally obtain children will often 
have a competitive advantage because they will have access to larger 
numbers of paper-adoptable children.  To make matters worse, 
within the world of intercountry adoption it is often the abuse-prone 
areas that produce, on a statistical basis, some of the highest rates of 
intercountry adoption.  The classic example of this phenomenon is 
Guatemala which, despite its relatively small population of less than 
fourteen million, has become one of the most significant sending 
nations,333 while also developing a reputation as a haven for 
 
 331 The activists in India, seeing the central role of money, go beyond my claim 
that American money inadvertently supports trafficking, to a stronger claim.  Activist 
Ramaswamy contends that, “American adoption agencies that charge $15,000 or 
much more for an adoption in India knowingly support baby trafficking [and that] 
[m]uch of the money goes to Indian adoption agencies to lubricate the system so 
babies will be available.”  Katz, supra note 231, at 1A (quoting Ramaswamy). 
 332 See id. 
 333 The population of Guatemala as of 2004 is commonly estimated at 12.7 
million, although other sources list figures somewhat higher.  See, e.g., BBC NEWS, 
COUNTRY PROFILE: GUATEMALA, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 
country_profiles/1215758.stm (last updated Nov. 16, 2004).  Despite this small 
population, Guatemala placed 2219 children in the United States in fiscal year 2002, 
1609 in 2001, and 1518 in 2000.  See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED TO ORPHANS COMING TO THE U.S., at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/ stats/stats_451.html (Feb. 5, 2005).  The 
United States received 6186 children from Guatemala in the five years between 1997 
and 2001, out of a total of 8913 placed internationally by Guatemala during those 
years.  PROCURATOR GENERAL’S OFFICE, ADOPTION PROCESS IN GUATEMALA: 1997–2001, 
at http://www.casa-alianza.org/EN/human-rights/illegal-adop/statistics/list9701. 
shtml (last visited Aug. 13, 2002) (on file with author). 
   
478 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:403 
 
 
profiteering attorneys or middlemen who buy or kidnap babies.334 
While the broad middle range of reputable adoption agencies 
within the United States officially decries corrupt practices, these 
agencies also consistently choose to involve themselves in adoption 
systems where such corruption is rampant, without taking significant 
remedial steps to avoid becoming complicit in child trafficking.  The 
better agencies, those who are in it for the cause rather than for the 
money, ultimately believe that playing the game is a necessary evil 
toward the good of saving children.  In the end, however, such high-
mindedness does little more than pad the pockets of those in sending 
countries who are more forthrightly using adoption as a “business 
center,” in the words of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.335 
Within the current adoption world, an agency that has strong 
scruples about avoiding involvement in adoption profiteering, 
corruption, or questionable practices in obtaining children would 
have difficulty functioning within a number of the sending countries.  
Some of the larger agencies might be able to avoid many of these 
difficulties by running their own orphanages and social service 
agencies within the sending countries.  In this way, an agency could 
ensure that true efforts really were made to assist families in keeping 
their children and in seeking domestic placements.  Smaller agencies 
that have to rely on the work of others within sending countries will 
generally have difficulty guaranteeing their work. 
The history of the Andhra Pradesh scandals indicates that 
Westerners networking within a sending country such as India may 
overestimate their capacity to identify honest, non-corrupt partners.  
A part of this difficulty is cultural, as definitions of what counts as 
“honest” and “non-corrupt” may differ significantly across cultures.  A 
further difficulty is that the very presence of the Western agency may 
create opportunities and temptations to profiteer that affirmatively 
corrupt previously honest entities.  Within the context of Andhra 
Pradesh, it is possible that some of the more established orphanages 
 
 334 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Provisional Agenda 
Item 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/73/Add.2 (2000) (on file with author); Sara 
Olkon, The Business of Selling Babies?  Guatemala Leads Latin America in the Number of 
Illegal Adoptions, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2000, at 1L.  For a defense of adoption from 
Guatemala, see Hannah Wallace, After Months of Being Closed, Adopted Families May Now 
Travel to Guatemala for Their Children, at http://www.rainbowkids.com/2003/10/ 
news/guatopens.chtml (Oct. 1, 2003). 
 335 See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
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and social service agencies, which possessed in some instances 
significant religious motivations, may have continued indefinitely as 
honest efforts in service to the poor, had they not been presented 
with the lucrative possibilities of placing children internationally.  
Finally, the financial opportunities of intercountry adoption may 
have induced some within India to go into the “adoption business” as 
a highly profitable racket requiring little more than the capacity to 
charm Westerners, bribe Indians, and create a network for obtaining 
children from desperately impoverished and vulnerable families.  
The costs of orphanage care, within a society where orphanage 
workers could be paid less than a dollar a day, could be paid out of 
the profits of such an operation.  Given the potentially high profits, a 
corrupt individual could run a reputable orphanage offering decent 
care, which would show well to foreigners, and still walk away with, in 
Indian terms, a small fortune.  Thus, a wide range of persons, from 
the initially honest servant of the poor, to a charming opportunist 
who knows how to tell Americans what they want to hear, might 
appear completely honest and well-intentioned to an American.  
Thus, Americans who believe they can pick out trustworthy persons in 
the adoption context are likely engaged in wishful thinking. 
A further difficulty is that some Indians serving as middlemen in 
such schemes could possess cultural attitudes that allow them to buy 
children or engage in other abusive practices without experiencing 
any sense of guilt or wrongdoing.  Some middle class or wealthy 
Indians may possess a starkly negative (they might say “realistic”) view 
of the poor, “backward” worlds of lower-class India, composed of 
tribals, scheduled castes, poor farmers, servants, and laborers.  From 
this perspective, moving children from such “backward” 
circumstances to the immeasurably richer developed world may seem 
like bestowing a great benefit, no matter what means are employed to 
wrest children from their families.  Any losses to birth families could 
easily be minimized through a worldview that looks with relative 
disdain at the lifestyle of those birth families, who are, after all, 
sometimes guilty of selling (or even killing) their own children.  It 
would be relatively easy for Westerners, who are easily shocked by the 
life and circumstances of the poor of India, to feel that they are in 
common cause with their Indian collaborators in moving children 
from great deprivation to adoptive homes in America, while 
overlooking the willingness of those collaborators to buy or even steal 
children.  From the Western perspective, after all, it is “their world,” 
and their job to get things done in a way that is culturally suitable.  
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Thus, the tacit agreement between United States agencies and their 
Indian counterparts is that the end justifies the means, and that the 
ugly means will be left within the discretion of those who know India 
best, the Indian agencies and facilitators. 
The paradox of the adoption world is that one can systematically 
buy and steal children from their parents, get rich in the bargain, and 
still feel like a hero, as though one had at great personal risk 
repeatedly rescued children from burning buildings.  Within a world 
gripped by the myth of saving a child, virtually every other value 
becomes expendable.  Those who believe the myth, or only pretend 
to believe it, find that, within the adoption world, even the most 
egregious sins and illegal conduct are excused so long as they 
successfully move children from third-world deprivation to first-world 
luxury. 
Thus, to expect adoption agencies, or any organization 
dominated by adoption agencies, to stop abusive adoption practices is 
akin to expecting an immigration rights group to patrol America’s 
borders.  Even where such a group is aware of technically illegal 
behavior, it would be more apt to excuse the behavior on behalf of 
the greater good or right of immigration.  Thus, any adoption system 
that relies on adoption agencies to police themselves, or peer 
accreditation systems to regulate the agencies, is doomed to be 
ineffective in stopping abusive adoption practices. 
2. United States Adoptive Parents Are Poorly Situated to 
Discover, Prevent, Investigate, or Report Abusive 
Adoption Practices 
Adoptive parents are very poorly situated to police the system of 
intercountry adoption.  Their primary motivation is to become the 
parents of a child.  They rely for their information primarily on 
adoption agencies, which tend to minimize irregularities and shield 
them from the actual workings of the system.  Their contacts with the 
foreign country are often of short duration, and sometimes tightly 
scripted.  Even when they become aware of irregularities, or gain 
extensive knowledge of the system, they easily become embroiled in 
efforts to “get their children out” regardless of those irregularities. 
The Andhra Pradesh adoption scandals illustrate these 
principles.  Most of the Western parents who accepted placements 
from Andhra Pradesh presumably believed that “their child” was a 
true orphan and “their agency” reliable.  Many were presumably 
never informed about the existence of prior scandals in the state, and 
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if they were informed they were presumably reassured that this would 
not affect their adoptions.  As each of the scandals broke—in 1996, 
1999, and 2001—prospective adoptive parents to varying degrees 
collaborated with one another in mutual efforts to “bring their 
children home.”  Some made heroic efforts, spending extensive 
amounts of time in India, with mixed results.  Although these parents 
became heroes within the adoption community for their efforts, and 
were sometimes respected by some within India, there is no evidence 
that any of them worked, either individually or collaboratively, to 
reform the adoption system or remedy the wrongs done in the name 
of adoption.336  Their heroic efforts were concentrated on completing 
their adoptions, or helping other Western prospective adoptive 
parents do the same.  There was understandably little time or 
appetite left to try to change the system, even when they came to 
understand some of its flaws.  Of course, most of the prospective 
adoptive parents with affected children were unable or unwilling to 
travel to India for extended periods of time.  They became reliant on 
others for their information, as they sought answers from afar to 
various questions: Was Peter Subbaiah a good man being maligned 
for religious and political reasons, or was he really guilty?337  Where is 
“my child?”  Was my child bought?  Whatever information or rumors 
were circulated among Western prospective adoptive parents, there 
was no organized effort to have a voice in repairing the Indian 
adoption system. 
Experience outside of Andhra Pradesh has confirmed that only a 
small minority of Western adoptive parents become seriously 
interested in efforts to reform adoption, even after being personally 
impacted by adoption scandals.338  When they do so, they face various 
obstacles: threats of libel suits from their agency, ostracism and 
criticism from adoption communities that view them as a threat to 
the continued operation of the system, and contractual gag 
provisions.  Even if they go so far as to sue their agencies, adoptive 
parents are likely to either settle the suits, and then become subject 
 
 336 See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 214, at 43–112 (describing efforts of Francis Abbott 
and other American parents to bring children out of adoption scandals to America); 
supra notes 290–312 and accompanying text (discussing extraordinary efforts of 
Sharon Van Epps to complete her adoption of Haseena). 
 337 See ABBOTT, supra note 214, at 44–53 (arriving at starkly negative conclusions 
about Subbaiah). 
 338 This conclusion is my own, after talking with parents and agency personnel 
impacted by adoption scandals in a number of countries. 
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to gag agreements as part of the settlement, or else lose the suit based 
on contractual disclaimers of responsibility for what occurs in foreign 
countries.  In any event, it appears that very few lawsuits have ever 
been brought against agencies for trafficking in children; the typical 
lawsuit instead complains about undisclosed conditions of the child.  
Thus, American courts have not yet recognized the harm to adoptive 
parents resulting from the “adoption” of a trafficked, stolen, or 
bought child.  The alternative of approaching government 
authorities in the hope of a remedy or some official action is 
understandably frightening to adoptive parents, who wonder about 
possible negative effects on their adopted children.  Will their child 
have her United States citizenship revoked or denied, or be taken 
from the adoptive family and shipped back to her country of origin, if 
the family comes forward with evidence of trafficking?  And in the 
rare event where adoptive parents have attempted to approach 
government authorities, they have sometimes experienced a lack of 
interest in investigating and pursuing their cases.  Thus, adoptive 
parents who do possess significant knowledge of improprieties rarely 
share it in any way likely to produce change. 
3. Some Sending Nations Are Unwilling or Unable to 
Prevent Significant or Systemic Abusive Adoption 
Practices 
Not all sending nations are equally prone to significant adoption 
scandals or abusive adoption practices.  The list of nations 
significantly affected by such difficulties in the last few years include 
Cambodia, Guatemala, India, Romania, and Vietnam.  One of the 
primary difficulties in these scandal-prone nations is their inability, or 
unwillingness, to enforce legal and ethical norms related to 
intercountry adoption.  The question is why some nations seem to be 
constantly mired in adoption scandals and improprieties, while 
adoption systems in other sending countries seem to function more 
ethically. 
Although poverty is a very significant factor in creating the 
conditions for abusive intercountry adoption systems, it is not a 
sufficient cause.  First, not all poor nations have become havens for 
abusive adoption practices.  Second, significant sectors of Indian 
society are quite economically and technologically advanced.  India is 
a nation-state representing one of the world’s great civilizations, the 
largest democracy in the world and the world’s second-most populous 
nation.  India is a land filled with poverty and poor people, and its 
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per capita income of $480339 is certainly low, but it would be wrong to 
simply label it a poor and backward nation.  The technological, 
cultural, intellectual, and economic resources of India are extensive 
and impressive.  A nation capable of inspiring the fear that it will 
capture, through “out-sourcing,” America’s high technology jobs,340 
presumably has the capacity to develop an adoption system with 
greater integrity. 
Why, then, has India had such difficulty in creating a more 
transparent and ethical intercountry adoption system?  To 
understand the problem, it may be helpful to view the issue of India’s 
role as a sending country for intercountry adoption from an Indian 
perspective.  Although it may not be apparent to outsiders, the 
adoption issue, within the broader scheme of the fate of India’s 
children, is completely insignificant.  India has been sending between 
four hundred and six hundred children a year to the United States,341 
and the total number being sent to all countries (including the 
United States) is approximately one thousand to thirteen hundred 
children annually.342  In a nation with 157 million children between 
zero and six years of age, and more than twenty million births per 
year,343 thirteen hundred children a year leaving the country for 
intercountry adoption can have no statistical effect, whether on 
population or on any category of public health or social welfare.  The 
same would be true even if India managed to send ten times as many 
children as it presently does to other countries for intercountry 
adoption.  Thus, although India’s children face, on a broad 
 
 339 Pink, supra note 212. 
 340 See id; Manjeet Kripalani & Peter Engardio, The Rise of India, and What it Means 
for America, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 8, 2003, at 66, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 341 See, e.g., EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION FACTS, 
at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/international.html (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2005) (indicating 503 Indian adoptions in America in 2000 and 543 in 2001); 
William L. Pierce, Finding American Homes: For U.S. Families, International Adoption Is at 
an All-Time High, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Oct. 24, 2002), at http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment%2Dpierce102402.asp (indicating 412 
Indian adoptions in fiscal year 2002). 
 342 See, e.g., BAJPAI, ADOPTION LAW, supra note 96, at 179 (stating that there were 
3331 intercountry adoptions in three year period from 1991 to 1993; Rahman, supra 
note 238 (quoting CARA Head stating that 7315 children were adopted 
internationally over last six years)); Ramaswamy & Bhukya, supra note 224, at 12 
(estimating that there are 1000 intercountry adoptions per year); supra note 318 
(summary of last eight months’ CARA figures show 708 approvals over eight month 
period). 
 343 See OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN., PROVISIONAL POPULATION TOTALS: INDIA, 
supra note 324. 
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demographic basis, many significant issues, from India’s perspective 
intercountry adoption is not a solution to any of those problems. 
To illustrate the insignificance of intercountry adoption for 
India, consider the legitimate concerns raised by India’s sex ratio of 
933 females per 1000 males, which drops to 927 females in the zero 
to six age group.344  India is “missing,” within the zero to six age 
range, nearly six million girls.345  Whether this is caused by sex-
selective abortion, female infanticide, or a general failure to allocate 
food, medical care, or other essentials to girls, it is certainly a 
legitimate societal concern.  In this context, although efforts to save 
female children are sometimes seen as a positive purpose of 
intercountry adoption, the significance of moving approximately six 
hundred to seven hundred girls a year out of the country is hardly a 
way to remedy the problem of India’s female population.  Aside from 
the absurdity of shipping away girls in a society lacking in females 
(about two-thirds of intercountry adoption placements out of India 
are girls),346 the fact remains that the numbers involved in 
intercountry adoption are so small that they have no demographic 
significance.  The same exercise could be done in regard to other 
problems affecting India: the numbers affected by malnutrition, 
illegal child labor, trafficking, or other wrongs simply are not going 
to be significantly affected by intercountry adoption, even if one 
assumed that every single child involved in intercountry adoption was 
being saved simultaneously from every single possible wrong befalling 
India’s children. 
From this perspective, it would be irrational for India to devote 
very much in the way of resources or effort in living up to 
international legal ideals for adoption.  In a land facing innumerable 
social problems, the allocation of scarce government resources and 
attention to those problems is critical.  In a land with hundreds of 
millions of impoverished people, questions of the best path to 
economic development should be preeminent.  Creating a system to 
ship a small number of “orphans” out of the country can hardly be a 
national priority. 
The attitude of Western adoptive parents to India’s problems 
may seem rather peculiar.  Americans who are overwhelmed by the 
 
 344 Id. 
 345 See BAJPAI, CHILD RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 455–56 (describing status of girl 
children in India, and noting that the sex ratio worsened from 1991 to 2001). 
 346 See supra note 318. 
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poverty and apparent degradation experienced by masses of people 
in India somehow seem to feel it a noble response to spend between 
$10,000 and $20,000 adopting an individual child, while leaving 
behind, in the orphanages, on the streets, and in the villages, tens of 
millions of similarly situated children.  The arbitrariness of selecting 
an individual child for such rescue, while doing little or nothing for 
those left behind, does not seem to bother most.  The odd effect 
might be compared to responding to a massive famine by selecting 
one starving individual for a donated diet of caviar and champagne.  
Obviously, the cost-effective, rational response to a famine is to erect 
a feeding station for the masses with low-cost, basic nutrition, not 
helicopter a few individuals out of the country so they can dine in 
ethnic restaurants in America. 
One answer to the question of why India has not developed a 
more transparent and efficient system of intercountry adoption, then, 
would be that it would be irrational to make such a system a national 
priority.  A second answer is the nature of the obstacles to the 
construction of such a system.  The primary obstacles are probably 
not financial, as India could, if it chose, charge foreign agencies and 
adoptive parents sufficient fees to fund the administrative and 
oversight costs necessary for a well-functioning system.  The primary 
obstacles to India developing an effective system of intercountry 
adoption are cultural and legal.  Even a cursory examination of those 
obstacles should illustrate the point. 
First, India has yet to develop an efficient, humane, and 
transparent system of domestic adoption.  The current statutory bases 
for domestic adoption, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act of 
1956, and Guardians and Wards Act of 1890, severely limit the 
capacities of Indians to adopt Indian children, due to limitations 
based on the existence of other children in the adoptive family, or 
the religion of the adoptive parents.347  Those laws reflect 
longstanding cultural obstacles to the broad acceptance of formal 
adoption as a way of building a family.  In addition, it is questionable 
whether the formal system of adoption has any connection or 
relevance to the majority of Indians, who may have limited access, 
financially or culturally, to initiating formal legal processes, and who 
may handle “adoption” instead through informal, community-based 
processes. 
There are ongoing efforts in India to address the inadequacies 
 
 347 See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
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of the formal system of domestic adoption, in part through the 
enactment and implementation of new laws.  In addition, adoption 
does seem to be gaining social acceptance.  Nonetheless, the 
bureaucratic implementation of reform often comes very slowly in 
India.  At best, it will likely be a decade before domestic adoption 
within India achieves significant reform affecting most of the 
nation.348 
The lack of a functional system of official domestic adoption 
within India is starkly evident from a statistical comparison with the 
United States.  In the United States, a country with a population of 
approximately 295 million people,349 there are approximately 50,000 
adoptions per year out of the foster system alone, which does not 
include children placed directly from birth parents to adoptive 
parents or through private agencies.350  By contrast, India, with over 
one billion people, officially reports less than 2,000 domestic 
adoptions per year.351  Thus, on a per capita basis, official domestic 
 
 348 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, §§ 40–45 (2000) 
includes provisions on adoption that could be used to authorize a (possibly partial) 
system of adoption not subject to the limitations of the Hindu Adoption Act.  
Apparently these provisions have not yet been generally implemented.  See BAJPAI, 
CHILD RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 46–47.  However, in January 2005, a district court 
judge in New Delhi ruled that intercountry adoptions should be processed under the 
Juvenile Justice Act, rather than under the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890.  This 
ruling appears to be effective only locally, and thus will not change adoption 
procedures in the rest of the country.  The ruling will, however, add to the national 
debate over the role of the Juvenile Justice Act in India’s adoption system.  See 
Complete Adoption Formalities in India, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 19, 2005, available at LEXIS, 
News Library; Foreign Adoptions: Juvenile Justice Act to Apply, at 
http://cities.expressindia.com/fulstory.php?newsid=114298 (Jan. 18, 2005); see 
generally Parvathi Menon, A New Act and Some Concerns, FRONTLINE (May 26–June 8, 
2001), at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1811/18110630.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2005). 
 349 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. AND WORLD POPULATION CLOCKS (estimating a 
U.S. population of 295,222,486), at http://www.census.gov/main/www/ 
popclock.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). 
 350 See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS 
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2001 ESTIMATES AS OF MARCH 2003, at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov./programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.htm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2005). 
 351 See BAJPAI, ADOPTION LAW, supra note 96, at 179 (stating that there were 3611 
domestic adoptions in India during three year period from 1991 to 1993); BAJPAI, 
CHILD RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 41 (noting in-country adoptions ranged from 1330 to 
1870 in the years 1996 to 2000); Bonner, supra note 10, at A3 (reporting that there 
were 1200 domestic adoptions in 2002).  Curiously, one source quotes a higher 
number of around 4000 per year; even if this is accurate, the per capita domestic 
Indian adoption rate would be quite low.  Cf. Rahman, supra note 238 (quoting Dev 
Barman of CARA to the effect that 25,000 domestic adoptions were approved in last 
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adoption appears at least one hundred times more common within 
the United States than in India.  This disparity seems likely to remain 
significant even if one takes into account the significant gaps in 
India’s adoption statistics, which apparently only include adoptions 
by CARA-approved agencies.352 
The lack of an effective system of domestic adoption within 
India means, in itself, that India cannot at present create a truly 
lawful system of intercountry adoption.  The law, after all, both 
nationally and internationally, requires that intercountry adoption be 
a last resort after domestic adoption.  This principle requires that 
efforts be made to adopt a child domestically prior to attempting 
intercountry adoption.  Those efforts to adopt a child domestically, 
however, are hampered by a domestic adoption system that artificially 
suppresses and limits domestic adoption.  Thus, even where it is 
factually accurate, on an individual basis, that sincere efforts were 
made to place a particular child domestically, on a system-wide basis 
adequate efforts to place a child domestically cannot occur until 
domestic adoption is at least as accessible as intercountry adoption.  
Indeed, how can India satisfy legal requirements to favor in-country 
adoption, when under current law there are many situations where a 
family that would be ineligible to complete an adoption domestically, 
could legally complete the adoption if they were foreign and adopted 
through the intercountry adoption system?353 
Another cultural obstacle to reform of India’s intercountry 
adoption system is the predominance and acceptance of corruption 
within Indian society.  It is not as though corruption and bribery were 
 
six years). 
 352 Apparently all of the available statistics on domestic adoption in India come 
from CARA, which only receives reports from CARA-approved agencies.  See, e.g., 
BAJPAI, CHILD RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 41 (listing CARA as source for statistics on 
domestic adoption from “recognized agencies”).  Agencies that do not place 
children internationally generally do not seek recognition from CARA and therefore 
do not report their adoptions to CARA.  Thus India, like the United States, lacks a 
formalized mechanism for gathering nationwide domestic adoption statistics. 
 353 For example, twins or other sibling groups with children of the same gender 
cannot be adopted domestically within the terms of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act of 1956.  See Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, No. 78, § 11 
(1956), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195678 (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2005)  In intercountry adoption, by contrast, individuals can avoid these 
limitations by obtaining guardianship from India, and then relying on their own 
adoption laws to finalize the adoption, regardless of limitations relating to religion or 
gender.  Thus, the odd situation is created where an adoption which would be 
denied to an Indian under domestic adoption is allowed to a foreigner through 
intercountry adoption. 
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uniquely associated with adoption.  To the contrary, corruption is a 
pervasive part of Indian life.  Corruption is so pervasive as to be 
normative in many spheres; thus, it takes an extraordinary effort for 
India to construct systems that are less subject to the taint, distortion, 
and inefficiencies of corruption.  This effort to create situations 
where corruption is less pervasive can occur within India when there 
are very strong incentives, as in the development of major industries, 
such as the IT sector.  But is it worth it to India to make these heroic 
efforts in regard to intercountry adoption, which lacks both 
humanitarian and economic benefit for the nation as a whole? 
An additional cultural obstacle to the development of a lawful 
system of intercountry adoption in India is the complex relationships 
among different groups within India.  Generally speaking, Western 
agencies will network with Indians who are literate, speak English, 
have access to telephones, computers, and the internet, and thus 
come from India’s middle or wealthy classes.  Many of the children 
being placed for adoption, however, come from tribal groups or 
scheduled castes, or at least from the hundreds of millions of poor 
farmers and laborers who comprise India’s poorer classes.  The 
mothers of these children will generally speak only Indian languages, 
be illiterate, and have little access to modern means of 
communication.  Even with the best of intentions, it would be very 
difficult to create non-exploitative relationships across the class, caste, 
and other social boundaries that divide Indian adoption workers 
from birth families. 
Finally, an additional obstacle to creating a system of lawful 
intercountry adoption in India lies in the difficulties of protecting the 
rights of poor, Indian women.  The severe gender imbalance within 
India, under which there are approximately thirty-five million missing 
females (933 females for every 1000 males),354 is the most obvious sign 
of the many difficulties suffered by India’s women.  The combination 
of being female, and a member of a caste, tribe, or social group 
traditionally disadvantaged in Indian society, places hundreds of 
millions of India’s girls and women in a starkly vulnerable position.  
The fundamental requirements of a lawful relinquishment, under 
which each parent makes an individual and free choice, arguably do 
not fit the realities of the lives of these women.  Is it correct, for 
example, to view the mother as an autonomous agent in trying to 
decide whether to place her child, when her family and group view 
 
 354 See supra note 324 (reporting data from 2001 Indian census). 
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her as bound to follow the dictates of her husband and mother-in-
law?  What does “choice” mean when an individual faces chronic 
malnutrition and debt?  And how does even an Indian from outside 
of the social group establish a respectful, non-exploitative 
relationship with both the individual woman, and her family and 
group, when that very family and group may be cruelly oppressing 
the woman? 
There are, then, multiple daunting difficulties that must be 
overcome to establish an intercountry adoption system in India that 
meets the standards of national and international law.  The point is 
not that establishment of such a system is impossible, but rather that 
it would require sustained and heroic efforts.  It is not at all clear, 
however, that such heroism would be best spent on adoption.  
Indeed, it would arguably be irrational for India, or Indians, to make 
the herculean efforts required to overcome these obstacles for the 
sake of constructing a better intercountry adoption system.  If one 
had the capacity to overcome legal gaps, cultural prejudices, 
corruption, misunderstandings across class lines, and the 
powerlessness of poor Indian women, one could perform far greater 
miracles in India than sending a thousand children a year out of the 
country. 
B. The United States Government Is the Primary Actor Capable of 
Reforming Intercountry Adoption 
1. The Andhra Pradesh Activists Have Succeeded in 
Shutting Down, Rather than Reforming, Intercountry 
Adoption 
If it is true that the intercountry adoption system is not self-
regulating, and that the primary actors involved lack the power or 
incentive to prevent abuses, then from where can reform come?  
Initially, one can see in the Andhra Pradesh story the possibility that 
reform could come from activists in sending countries who put 
pressure on their governments to act.  The difficulty with this thesis is 
that the Andhra Pradesh activists have succeeded more in shutting 
down the intercountry adoption system than in reforming it.  It is 
sometimes unclear, in any event, whether the activists are simply 
ideologically opposed to sending Indian children out of the country, 
even if such adoptions were done in accordance with the principles 
of national and international law.  Even if the activists were 
committed to reforming, rather than shutting down, the system, 
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there is little indication that they would be capable of overcoming the 
obstacles to such reform noted above.355  Activists cannot single-
handedly overcome legal barriers, cultural prejudice, pervasive 
corruption, and the powerlessness of poor Indian women.  Nor can 
activists ensure that the many players in the intercountry adoption 
system perform honestly and efficiently.  As a protest movement, it is 
much easier to shut the system down than to reform it.  For activists, 
shutting down a system primarily requires that one persuade one of 
the many authorities who must approve each adoption to consistently 
deny such approvals.  At the present time, for example, the courts of 
Andhra Pradesh, including both the family court and the High 
Court, appear sufficiently hostile to intercountry adoption to make it 
difficult for new cases to proceed.356  Even the Indian courts, however, 
seem largely powerless to reform, rather than shut down, India’s 
intercountry adoption system. 
2. The United States Government Should Reform 
Intercountry Adoption by Creating an Accountability 
Structure Which Holds United States Adoption 
Agencies Legally Responsible for the Actions of 
Agencies and Individuals with Whom They Work in 
Sending Nations 
Among the actors involved in intercountry adoption, the United 
States government is the entity best situated to bring about significant 
reform.  There are several reasons why the United States is well 
situated for this role.  First, the United States is the largest recipient 
nation,357 giving it a unique stake in the global adoption system.  
Second, the United States government is already involved, as an 
immigration matter, in intercountry adoptions, and under the Hague 
Convention, federal responsibility for intercountry adoption will 
become an international treaty obligation.  Third, the United States 
government generally has a presence in the various sending 
countries, and thus has agents able to investigate matters occurring in 
other countries.  Finally, unlike many sending nations, the United 
States government does not have to overcome any essential legal or 
cultural obstacles within American society in order to enforce the 
fundamental standards of intercountry adoption. 
 
 355 See supra Part III.A. 
 356 See supra notes 293–318 and accompanying text. 
 357 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 23, at 537; Kapstein, supra note 5, at 115. 
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The primary difficulty faced by the United States government 
has been a lack of political will to enforce the relevant legal norms.  
This lack of political will stems from at least two sources: first, the 
understandably low priority of intercountry adoption for the federal 
authorities, and second, the political pressures created by the 
adamant demands of American adoptive parents and agencies, who 
generally urge that adoptions be completed and entry into the 
United States approved even in situations involving serious violations 
of the norms governing adoption. 
The transitions involved in United States ratification of the 
Hague Convention provide the opportunity for the United States 
government to take up the task of reforming intercountry adoption, 
by taking the political high ground against those within the American 
adoption community who lobby for the status quo.  The political 
battle within the United States will concern the question of the 
“second-choice,” as some argue that the global adoption pipeline 
must be kept open at all costs, despite credible charges of illegality 
and abuse, and others argue that abusive adoption practices must be 
stopped even if this means sometimes slowing or stopping adoptions.  
The hope that can be offered at this point is that the United States 
government is capable of substantially improving the global adoption 
system, if it can summon the political will to do so. 
Assuming the political will to act affirmatively to reform 
intercountry adoption, the next question is one of method.  The 
United States government should use the Hague implementation 
process to create an accountability system.  The United States 
government would anchor this accountability system by holding 
United States adoption agencies to account through the Hague 
process of government accreditation of agencies.  Critical to this 
accountability structure would be multiple legal devices by which 
United States adoption agencies would themselves be held 
accountable for the actions of agencies and individuals with whom 
they worked in the sending countries. 
Within the current adoption system, United States agencies 
generally escape all accountability for scandals and abuses by 
disclaiming any responsibility or control over the acts of their partner 
agencies and facilitators in other countries.  For example, the United 
States agencies who were involved in placing children through 
Sanjeeva Rao’s ASD orphanage, or Peter Subbaiah’s Good Samaritan 
orphanage, or the Kumar’s John Abraham Bethany orphanage, 
apparently considered themselves free of any responsibility or liability 
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even if those Indian individuals and agencies were guilty of child trafficking 
or other violations of adoption norms. 
By contrast, the United States government should work to create 
an adoption system in which United States agencies are liable for 
these kinds of fundamental violations of the legal and ethical norms 
governing adoption.  Of course, United States agencies will respond 
that they cannot control or be responsible for what occurs in 
countries like India.  This kind of claim has become so familiar within 
the adoption world that its irresponsible and unethical nature is not 
clearly recognized.  It is an argument, it should be noted, which is not 
accepted in other situations involving cross-border provisioning of 
services or goods.  No American company providing customer service 
to Americans through a call center in India could disclaim 
responsibility for privacy violations, sloppy work, or rudeness, because 
“we can’t control what happens in India.”  No American company 
employing software programmers or financial analysts in India could 
avoid fundamental ethical norms because “we can’t stop corruption 
in India.”  No importer of goods into the United States would be 
permitted to disclaim product liability responsibility for defective 
products based on the argument that we “can’t control the way things 
are made in China.”  In a connected, interdependent world, it is 
normative that professionals, organizations, and industries involved 
in cross-border work are responsible for the integrity and quality of 
the service or good, regardless of how many nations were networked 
and involved in providing or creating the service or good.  
Responsibility for adoption is not less significant or important than 
these other responsibilities, and there is no reason that institutions 
and individuals working in adoption services should be able to 
disclaim their normal responsibilities in such brazen fashion.  It is 
absurd to have an industry present itself to adoptive families as highly 
ethical, and involved in placing orphans into loving homes, and then 
to allow the industry to disclaim responsibility when it turns out that 
it has instead been involved in creating orphans and breaking apart 
families. 
Thus, the legally enforced position of the United States 
government should be that adoption agencies in the United States 
are legally accountable for the actions of their partner agencies and 
facilitators working within sending countries.  Some United States 
agencies may withdraw from some adoption fields because of this 
exposure to greater liability and responsibility.  Some may be unable 
to obtain liability insurance at reasonable rates, particularly if they 
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place children from certain high-risk nations.  In the longer term, 
however, only agencies that are willing to be held responsible for 
their entire network of service providers can be trusted to exercise 
the great responsibility of moving children across borders. 
The exact legal and institutional mechanisms by which systems 
of accountability can be built into the global adoption system are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  The question is complex, and 
requires additional and intricate analysis.358  The thesis of this Article, 
however, is that adoption scandals, like those in Andhra Pradesh, 
illustrate the necessity of building such systems of accountability into 
the global adoption system.  Without such systems of accountability, 
one can virtually never know, when holding an adopted child, 
whether the child was an orphan needing a home, or a beloved 
daughter or son illicitly taken from a home.  Without accountability, 
the pretty face of adoption as a loving act that fills a real need in a 
child’s life will, all too often, turn out to be no more than a mask 
covering over ugly realities of trafficking, profiteering, and needless 
tragedy. 
 
 
 358 Some initial suggestions are found in my comments on the proposed Hague 
regulations.  See Smolin, supra note 328.  I intend to elaborate on this issue of 
providing accountability in a subsequent work. 
